






















A thesis submitted to the Johns Hopkins University in conformity with the 















© 2014 Adam Paffenroth  







The Cold War and the ensuing thaw in tensions between East and West has marked 
a period of 60 years in which there has not been a truly global conflict. This lack of 
great power conflict however has been marked by a number of low-level 
asymmetric conflicts in which weaker states or non-state parties have often 
complicated the goals of numerically and technologically superior adversaries.  
Proxy warfare in particular, in which one state provides support to an outside/third 
party and avoids direct conflict, was used extensively by the Soviet Union and the 
United States during this period and continues in certain forms today. This thesis 
explores three distinct case studies in which states employed varying forms of proxy 
warfare, either through a selected surrogate organization or through support to a 
nation-state within the context of a larger conflict. Pakistan’s support to militant 
organizations in Afghanistan, Iran’s role in shaping Hezbollah as well as the United 
State’s involvement in the Iran-Iraq War through proxy all underscore the value 
nation-states place on this form of warfare and its role as a tool of foreign policy. In 
each of these instances these three states sought to avoid outright military 
involvement while also seeking to advance their interests in strategically valuable 
venues, while recognizing strategic strength serves as a deterrent to adversarial 
action. Through an examination of why states conduct proxy warfare and its role as 
a tool of international policy the following chapters reveal states, both autocratic 
and democratic, employ differing forms of proxy warfare to advance their national 
security interests, while minimizing the risk of provoking a wider conflict, as well as 
to advance a state’s influence in a strategic venue. 
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 1 
Introduction 
Proxy warfare has been a constant feature of warfare throughout the last 
century and into the 21st century. This form of war is oftentimes used by large and 
small states as a way to exercise influence, challenge a peer competitor, or respond 
to rival proxy forces. In the 1980s, the United States used a form of proxy warfare 
through its support to the Afghan mujahedeen. Similarly, the Soviet Union 
supported various national liberation groups throughout the developing world so as 
to challenge Western-backed regimes during the Cold War. However, proxy warfare 
does not simply take place between the hegemons in the international system, but 
also amongst lesser powers for a variety of reasons. This thesis examines why states 
conduct proxy warfare and whether it is viewed as a legitimate tool of international 
policy. The following chapters identify specific research questions that will advance 
our understanding of nation states’ use of proxy forces as a tool of foreign policy and 
whether the structure of the international system creates incentives for this 
behavior.   
Existing literature on proxy warfare tends to focus on the tactical and 
operational aspects of these conflicts. In the case of Lebanese Hezbollah, Iranian 
covert support is traditionally viewed through the lens of pan-Shia fundamentalism 
and the role of ideology. In the case of Pakistan’s support to the Taliban, the 
predominant analysis focuses on the role of the powerful Inter-Services Intelligence 
Directorate but often without a discussion of larger historical precedence and 
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strategic considerations.1 The United States’ involvement in the Iran-Iraq War is 
often seen through the lens of the Iranian revolution of 1979 without a comparative 
analysis of larger American strategic interests in the Middle East. While a 
predominance of literature discusses hegemonic involvement in various regional 
conflicts, little research has been conducted to determine the role the structure of 
the international plays in influencing these actions.  
Prior to examination of the following case studies of conflict it is necessary to 
first define what constitutes a proxy war. Writing in “The Enemy of My Enemy” 
author Geraint Hughes seeks to develop a theoretical framework to more fully 
define characteristics of this type of conflict noting a prevalence of direct assistance, 
the existence of a common enemy and the maintaining of the relationship for a 
certain period of time in proxy conflicts.2 Author Andrew Mumford writes, “Proxy 
wars are the indirect engagement in a conflict by third parties wishing to influence 
its strategic outcome. Mumford views British military aid to the Confederacy and the 
United States; Lend Lease program to Britain and the Soviet Union as forms of proxy 
warfare. Mumford’s definition of proxy war is not limited to bi-lateral, or state-to-
state interaction as he also expands this to a state’s support covert or otherwise to 
any belligerent engaged in a conflict. 3For the purpose of this thesis portfolio I will 
                                                        
1 Rashid, Ahmed. "The Anarchic Republic of Pakistan." National Interest no. 109 (2010): 24;  
Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate: A State within a State?" JFQ: Joint Force 
Quarterly, no. 48 (2008): 104-110. 
2 Hughes, Geraint.  “My Enemy’s Enemy: Proxy Warfare in International Politics”. (Eastbourne: 
Sussex Academic Press, 2012) 11.   




use a definition similar to Mumford’s that states where an outside state attempts to 
affect the outcome of a conflict to meet its larger strategic goals through the use of a 
third party and without direct involvement a proxy war is present.  
Through a closer look at these three separate case studies, involving both 
regional and hegemonic powers alike, a number of important trends as they relate 
to proxy war may be further identified. The United State’s support to both Iran and 
Iraq in particular highlights the role this warfare plays in protecting a delicate 
regional-status quo while also advancing larger strategic interests. Without direct 
combat involvement and potential backlash, this type of warfare serves as a 
valuable tool by which states can apply to defend their vital national interests.  The 
following chapters examine three distinct case studies by which to assess how 
features of the international system—including the existence of anarchy and the 
frequent outcome of the security dilemma—affect a state’s perception of its 
strategic environment, and under what conditions a state might participate in a 
proxy war.   
Chapter 1: Dangerous Game: Pakistan’s Strategic Rationale for Supporting Militant 
Groups in 1990s Afghanistan  
 Research Question: What strategic and historic considerations influenced 
Pakistan’s covert support to proxy forces in Afghanistan during the 1990s? 
This chapter examines what historic and strategic considerations influenced 
Pakistani decision makers in their support to various militant organizations in 
Afghanistan during the 1990s. Existing literature on this topic focuses on Pakistan’s 
support to these groups largely based upon an ideological commitment to the 
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Taliban and exporting a radical brand of influence to Pakistan’s neighboring states. 
To understand what considerations influenced these decision makers, I will first 
examine the British Imperial experience in Afghanistan and the larger Central Asian 
region. This case study provides an examination of the similar strategic 
considerations British leaders faced confronting the Russian Empire and how 
Afghanistan served as a venue for their strategic competition. This case study is 
analyzed in comparison with Pakistan’s support to select militant organizations in 
Afghanistan during the 1990s. 
This paper seeks to understand the historic and strategic considerations for 
Pakistan’s support to militant organizations in Afghanistan through the 1990s. In 
particular, this paper will explore the parallels between the Russian and British 
Imperial experiences during the late 19th Century and the more contemporary 
struggle between India and Pakistan. Through this analysis, I explore Pakistani 
actions during the 1990s, which can be attributed to that state’s precarious strategic 
position as opposed to an affinity towards radical Islamic movements. The 1990s 
serves as a particularly valuable reference by which to examine deeper issues of 
Pakistan’s strategic environment and the classical security dilemma. Following the 
Soviet defeat in Afghanistan and the post Cold War environment Pakistani decision 
makers confronted a complex security environment in the traditional battleground 
venue of Afghanistan. The chapter finds that in this chaotic environment, 
Islamabad’s support to militant organizations was the best means by which to 
guarantee its security by preventing a pro-Indian government on its western 
border.  
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This paper explores existing literature on the subject by analyzing previous 
arguments made towards understanding Pakistani actions and support for militant 
organizations in Afghanistan. Previous literature focuses on the ISI’s relationships 
with Mujahedeen elements forged during the Soviet-Afghan War and valuable 
lessons learned in asymmetric warfare battling a numerically superior enemy. 
Existing arguments discuss Pakistan’s support to militant organizations as a natural 
outgrowth of the increasing Islamisation of its armed forces, a process begun under 
former President Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq.4  This paper compares Pakistani behavior 
in the 1990s to the Imperial British Great Game of the 19th Century by first analyzing 
Afghanistan’s strategic importance in the region during both periods. Next the paper 
explores the contemporary Pakistani concept of “strategic depth” and how this same 
dynamic influenced British planners of the 19th Century. Finally, after analyzing 
British attempts to coerce Afghanistan through intimidation and bribery rather than 
outright control, this paper will reveal a similar relationship between Pakistan and 
various militant groups.  
An assessment of Pakistan’s strategic position reveals how a weak Afghan 
government and Pakistan’s suspicions of India served as prime drivers for its 
support to surrogates and proxies. By highlighting Afghanistan as an age-old proxy 
battlefield for the region it is reasonable to assume Islamabad will maintain covert 
support to select militant groups to advance its interests following the withdrawal 
of international forces after 2014. Ultimately, by a more comprehensive discussion 
                                                        
4 Kapur, S. Paul, and Sumit Ganguly. "The Jihad Paradox." International Security 37, no. 1 (2012): 
122. 
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of historic and strategic considerations, this paper will identify why Pakistani 
decision makers believed support to militant organizations in Afghanistan would 
advance Islamabad’s security interests during the 1990s.  
Chapter 2: Revolutionary Outreach: A Neorealist Examination of Iran’s Creation of 
Hezbollah  
 Research Question: How did the nature of the international system affect 
Iran’s decision to support Lebanese Hezbollah as a selected proxy force in the 
1980s?   
 Chapter 2 examines Iranian covert support to Lebanese Hezbollah during the 
1980s. Iranian foreign policy in the immediate years after the revolution and the 
Ayatollah’s consolidation of political power in 1981 has often been characterized as 
an attempt to export the Islamic revolution to neighboring Arab states. Existing 
literature focuses on the nature of the Iranian regime, which blended a Shia 
theocracy with a revolutionary political movement which challenged the existing 
power structure in the Middle East. The chapter argues, however, that Iran’s actions 
during this period (specifically its support to Lebanese Hezbollah) can also be 
understood through the constraints on Iranian behavior due to the structure of the 
international system. In particular an examination of neorealist theory, which posits 
that states seek to guarantee their survival in the international system by 
maximizing their power, may allow for a better understanding of the strategic 
drivers for Iranian action during this period. Seen through this context, the chapter 
develops a fuller account of Iranian behavior in the 1980s than the existing 
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conventional explanations, and discusses the structural factors that impacted its 
foreign policy decisions.  
Conventional interpretations regarding Iranian involvement in the Lebanese 
Civil War largely focused on common Shia linkages between Hezbollah and the 
Iranian government.5 However, little literature focuses on the structure of the 
international system and whether or not it provides certain incentives for 
governments, revolutionary or otherwise, to engage in a proxy war as a means of 
enhancing national power. The chapter’s review of literature highlights the key 
existing arguments that explain Iranian support to Lebanese Hezbollah. This 
literature emphasizes the unique nature of the Iranian government as a key driver 
for its behavior. Second, the chapter reviews two theories within neo-realism, 
defensive and offensive realism, and applies their key tenets to Iranian behavior, 
specifically its support to Hezbollah, to better understand the key drivers for its 
behavior during this period.  
 International relations scholars share a common assumption that the 
international system is anarchic. This anarchy is defined as a system in which no 
force or supra-national entity exists to govern the behavior of states. While 
international institutions such as the United Nations can sometimes serve as 
arbiters between feuding states, the lack of a central authority above individual 
states creates a highly unpredictable environment in which states must assume a 
worst-case scenario and seek to maximize either their power or their security.  
                                                        
5 Siklawi, Rami. "The Dynamics of the Amal Movement In Lebanon 1975-90." Arab Studies 
Quarterly 34, no. 1 (Winter2012): 6-7.  
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 This paper applies a neo-realist theoretical approach to better understand 
Iranian support to Lebanese Hezbollah by assessing the structure of the 
international system.6, 7 Through a discussion of the competing versions of neo-
realism and an understanding of the structural constraints imposed on the Islamic 
Republic, we may be able to better understand the prime drivers for Iranian 
behavior while also seeking to understand the geo-strategic environment in which 
the revolutionary government found itself.  
In light of a predominance of literature, which focuses on the Islamist/Shia 
fundamentalist nature of the Iranian regime, a structural analysis of Tehran’s 
behavior may prove to better identify additional drivers for the regime’s behavior.8 
A review and discussion of Iranian behavior prior to the revolution and possible 
symmetries in its actions after the fall of the Shah also identifies the likely role 
nationalism vice ideology played in determining the regime’s actions. Iranian covert 
training and support to Hezbollah may be seen as a calculated recognition of Iran’s 
desire for primacy in the region in the face of numerous external adversaries 
allowing the regime a tool by which to enhance its national power in an uncertain 
environment whereby strength is defined as the ultimate guarantor of security. 
 
 
                                                        
6 Davide Fiammenghi. "The Security Curve and the Structure of International Politics: A 
Neorealist Synthesis." International Security 35, no. 4 (Spring 2011): 126-154.;  
Ibid. 129. 
Brooks, Stephen G. "Dueling Realism. (cover story)." International Organization 51, no. 3 
(Summer97 1997): 464 
8 Arjomand, Said Amir. After Khomeini Iran under his successors. Oxford, England: Oxford 
University Press (2009): 135. 
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Chapter 3: Delicate Balance: The United States’ shifting support between Iraq and 
Iran during the 1980s to maintain the Status Quo through Proxy Warfare 
Research Question: What factors best explain the United States’ shifting support 
to opposing sides during the course of the Iran-Iraq War?  
The United States’ involvement in the Iran - Iraq War  presents a unique case 
in which a great power attempts to conduct a form of offshore balancing, first by 
seeking to prevent a conventional military victory by one force but also later 
support to Iraq to prevent the same outcome by the Iranian military.  Having 
replaced a stalwart ally in Imperial Iran, the new revolutionary government posed a 
number of threats for the more traditional power centers of Riyadh and Baghdad 
with most Arab leaders viewing the theocratic government as a threat to the 
regional status quo. While the United States had little common cause with either the 
Islamic Republic or the Iraqi regime the strategic role the region played in American 
oil consumption and the global economy necessitated Washington’s sometime 
contradictory policies. American planners began a strategic reassessment of the 
country’s role in the Middle East following the withdrawal of British forces east of 
the Suez in 1968. Coupled with the Arab-led Oil Embargo in the wake of the Yom 
Kippur War, the United States recognized the region as a key battleground between 
East and West. 
 A review of relevant literature reveals many Middle East analysts and 
commentators view the US’ support to Iraq as a means of stunting the effects of the 
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Iranian Revolution.9 For some, the revolutionary nature of the Iranian regime is 
recognized as the prime driver for US support to Baghdad, while others believe the 
United States was simply trying to maintain the pre-existing status quo of the 
region.10 A discussion and application of offshore balancing theory fails to fully 
explain why the United States believed it was in its self-interest to back opposing 
parties in a conflict. An analysis of literature and application of this theory reveals 
US actions were driven by a complicated goal of maintaining a careful balance 
between both Tehran and Baghdad. This was likely based in Washington’s continual 
belief that possible Soviet action in the region was the greatest threat to it’s regional 
hegemony. The possibility of a Soviet-backed client in either Iran or Iraq likely 
served as the prime driver for US behavior. Washington’s involvement by proxy in 
the conflict was meant to counter Iranian gains after 1983 which posed the threat of 
overturning the regional status quo and possibly inviting further Soviet interference 
in the region.  
 The United State’s overt support to Baghdad and covert support to Tehran 
through the Iran-Contra Affair were largely driven by wider strategic 
considerations, most notably, the American fear of Soviet involvement in the region 
and the possibility of a Russian intervention. Washington’s concern the Iranian 
Revolution would spread beyond its borders were largely secondary to a more 
central goal of resisting possible Soviet entreaties towards the warring states. The 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 coupled with the Iranian Revolution earlier 
                                                        
9 Jones, Toby Craig. "America, Oil, and War in the Middle East." Journal Of American History 99, 
no. 1 (June 2012): 210. 
10 Ramzani, R.K. “Khumayni’s Islam in Iran’s Foreign Policy.” Islam in Foreign Policy, ed. Adeed 
Dawisha (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 20. 
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that same year undercut the US’ containment strategy of which Imperial Iran had 
been a key element. Faced with the possibility Moscow was seeking access to a 
warm water port and the potential vulnerability of its key oil resources, Washington 
adopted a more interventionist policy in the region to protect its interests. 11  
American involvement in the 8-year conflict is often seen through the lens of its role 
as an offshore balancer. While this theory provides important insights to 
understanding prime drivers for American action, a discussion of the larger 
strategic context in which America provided varying degrees of support to both 
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Chapter 1: Dangerous Game: Pakistan’s Strategic Rationale for Supporting Militant 
Groups in 1990s Afghanistan  
 13 
 Research Question: What strategic and historic considerations influenced 




The Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 led to an unparalleled 
covert response by the US and Pakistani intelligence agencies as large amounts of 
aid would be funneled through the powerful Pakistani Directorate General for Inter 
Services Intelligence (ISI) to select groups of Afghan freedom fighters loosely known 
as the Mujahedeen. This series of actions would ultimately result in the defeat of the 
Soviet Union as well as the eventual collapse of their puppet government in Kabul 
under Mohammad Najibullah while later giving rise to the fundamentalist Taliban 
movement. The intervening years of the 1990s and early 2000s would be a chaotic 
time for Afghanistan as former allies within the disparate Mujahedeen movements 
would begin a process of savage civil war with ever-shifting alliances and the near 
complete devastation of Afghan society. Since that time and the ensuing instability 
in South Asia, commentators have offered numerous theories to explain Pakistan’s 
behavior and its much-maligned support to various militant organizations. This 
paper seeks to answer what historic and strategic considerations influenced 
Pakistan’s support to various militant organizations in Afghanistan during the 
1990s.  
As Western policy makers remain frustrated by a lack of Pakistani 
cooperation in Afghanistan and seek to sever the covert ties between the ISI and 
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militant groups it is import to understand Pakistani history and its security 
environment.  Existing theories on Pakistan’s behavior often begin by analyzing the 
role of it’s military dictator, Mohammed Zia ul-Haq and his desire to recreate 
Pakistan into an Islamic state.12 These theories focus on his strategy of arming 
Islamic fighters against Soviet Russia and a broader desire in which ul-Haq saw 
Jihad as strategy against Pakistan’s enemies. While Zia changed Pakistani norms and 
sought a greater role for Islam in its policymaking, its behavior in Afghanistan may 
be better understood by examining both historical and strategic considerations.13 
These considerations will be analyzed against British Imperial ambitions of the 19th 
Century. This time period in particular bears a striking resemblance to 
contemporary Pakistani strategic desires for Afghanistan and Central Asia. As 
Britain feared Afghanistan would become another Russian client state, thereby 
threatening London’s hold on India, modern Pakistan has viewed Afghanistan as a 
vital theater for its security ever watchful of Indian incursion.14   
It is also essential to note Pakistan’s history is marked by an almost continual 
covert and outright struggle against its numerically superior regional competitor in 
India. Since the founding of both Pakistan and India in 1947, the tension between 
these two nation-states has been punctuated by several short but decisive victories 
for India while Pakistan has seen a large reduction in territory, most notably when it 
                                                        
12 Coll, Steve. Ghost wars: the secret history of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the 
Soviet invasion to September 10, 2001. New York: Penguin Press (2004): 61, 63.  
13 Rashid, Ahmed. Taliban the Power of Militant Islam in Afghanistan and Beyond. London: I.B. 
Tauris & Co. (2002): 194-195.  
14 Khan, Feisal. "Why Borrow Trouble for Yourself and Lend It to Neighbors? Understanding the 
Historical Roots of Pakistan's Afghan Policy." Asian Affairs: An American Review 37, no. 4 (2010): 
179.;  
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lost East Pakistan (Bangladesh), to Indian forces in 1971.15 Following this decisive 
defeat, Pakistani officials drew upon British Imperial strategy as they sought to 
develop “strategic depth” into Afghanistan figuring in the event of future hostilities 
with India, Afghanistan could provide a reliable rear guard as well as a ready 
sanctuary for the Pakistani military. Similar to the struggle between Imperial Russia 
and the British Empire during the late 19th Century, Afghanistan has long served as a 
venue for great power politics with outside powers supporting or subverting 




This paper seeks to understand the historic and strategic considerations for 
Pakistan’s support to militant organizations in Afghanistan through the 1990s. In 
particular, this paper will explore the parallels between the Russian and British 
Imperial experiences during the late 19th Century and the more contemporary 
struggle between India and Pakistan. The 1990s serves as a particularly valuable 
reference by which to examine deeper issues of Pakistan’s strategic environment 
and the classical security dilemma. In this anarchic environment, Islamabad’s 
support to militant organizations will be assessed through a wider historical context 
to determine the strategic and historic considerations, which influenced Pakistan’s 
actions.  
                                                        
15 Ganguly, Sumit. “Wars without End: The Indo-Pakistani Conflict”. Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science 541, Small Wars (1995): pp. 167-178 
16Lieven, Anatol. Pakistan: A hard country. London: Allen Lane, 2011.   
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This paper will first explore existing literature on this subject by analyzing 
previous arguments made towards understanding Pakistani behavior and support 
for militant organizations in Afghanistan. Additionally, the paper will explore 
previous discussions on this topic and note how previous analyses of Pakistani 
actions fail to fully understand these actions. This paper will compare Pakistani 
behavior in the 1990s to the Imperial British Great Game of the 19th Century by first 
analyzing the strategic importance Afghanistan plays in the region. Next the paper 
explore the contemporary Pakistani concept of “strategic depth” and how this 
dynamic effected British planners of the 19th Century. Finally, by analyzing British 
attempts to coerce Afghanistan through intimidation and bribery rather than 
outright control this paper will reveal a similar relationship Pakistani developed 
towards various militant groups in 1990s Afghanistan. Ultimately, by a more 
comprehensive discussion of historic and strategic considerations, this paper will 
identify why Pakistani decision makers believed support to militant organizations in 
Afghanistan would advance Islamabad’s security interests during the 1990s.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
While much has been previously written with respect to Pakistan’s role 
during the Soviet-Afghan War, much of the existing literature fails to fully address 
the deeper reasons behind Islamabad’s actions during the 1990s. Pakistan’s role 
defeating the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan coupled with the fear of Indian 
support to Kabul created structural incentives in which Islamabad recognized 
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Afghanistan as a valuable theater to advance its security interests lest it be 
surrounded by Indian influence. Lacking a single coherent Afghan political group 
which to support, the ISI continued to provide lethal aid to select militant 
organizations to achieve its larger political and economic goals for the region.  Most 
notable amongst these groups was Pakistan’s favored Mujahedeen group 
throughout the 1980s, Hezb-i-Islami (HIG) and its leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyr. Later 
this proxy support would shift to the Taliban movement, as the HIG would prove 
unable to capture Kabul in an outright military struggle.17 Similar to British Imperial 
planners of the 19th Century, contemporary Pakistani leaders identified Afghanistan 
as a logical venue by which to further their interests and to create strategic depth in 
the face of an overwhelming Indian adversary as well as the country’s role as a 
gateway to the wider Central Asian region.18 
Analysis of Pakistani behavior with regards to Afghanistan often begins with 
an examination of Islamabad’s involvement in arming the anti-Soviet resistance 
during the 1980s. This covert program of providing lethal aid to various proxy 
forces had an enormous impact on hastening the end of the Cold War as well as 
enhancing Pakistani ambitions for Central Asia. In the aftermath of the Soviet 
Union’s collapse, many Pakistani policy makers saw the newly independent states as 
a new sphere for Islamabad’s influence with Afghanistan being a vital first-step.19 
                                                        
17 Coll, Steve. Ghost wars: the secret history of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the 
Soviet invasion to September 10, 2001. New York: Penguin Press (2004): 182-183.  
18 Ziring, Lawrence. "Unraveling The Afghanistan-Pakistan Riddle." Asian Affairs: An American 
Review 36, no. 2 (2009): 65.; 
19 Coll, Steve. Ghost wars: the secret history of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the 
Soviet invasion to September 10, 2001. New York: Penguin Press (2004): 305.  
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While much has been written regarding Pakistan’s role in supporting the nascent 
Taliban movement in the 1990s few take into consideration larger issues of 
Afghanistan’s long-standing role in Pakistani security and the country’s place as a 
historic battlefield between competing great powers.      
Similar to the “Great Game” played between the Imperial Russian and British 
Empires of the 19th Century, Pakistani support to militant organizations may have 
provided low-cost method of advancing Islamabad’s security interests – most 
notably the creation of strategic depth in Afghanistan and denying a India a pro-New 
Delhi government in Kabul – while also ensuring Pakistani access to the wider 
Central Asian region. Pakistani strategic planners faced a similar set of 
considerations today as British planners faced throughout the 19th Century. In the 
face of a regional peer competitor with opposing security interests, Afghanistan has 
served as a stage for larger strategic struggles.  
This review will focus on the existing literature of Pakistani support to 
militant organizations in Afghanistan by first exploring the historical precedents for 
such actions and then exploring Pakistan’s need for strategic depth. Articles on 
either subject tend to view Pakistani support to surrogates as linked to a common 
Islamic ideology or an extension of Islamabad’s support to proxies during the Soviet 
– Afghan War.20 While these articles address certain key aspects of this behavior 
they fail to fully account for a deeper understanding of Pakistani history, specifically 
                                                        
20 Cheema, Pervaiz Iqbal. "The Afghanistan Crisis And Pakistan's Security Dilemma." Asian Survey 
23.3 (1983): 233.  
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the effect its disastrous loss to India in 1971 as well as an inherently precarious geo-
strategic position. This review will examine existing literature on why Pakistan 
maintained relationships to various militant groups in the 1990s by first examining 
the historical context of Islamabad’s support for select groups. Next the paper will 
underline Pakistan’s strategic position and how this served as a prime driver for its 
support to surrogates in the 1990s. Finally the paper will highlight Afghanistan as 
an age-old proxy battlefield for the region and examine why Islamabad recognized 
strategic value in fostering these partnerships to advance its security interests.  
 
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
Existing literature examining Pakistani support to surrogates in Afghanistan 
tends to begin its focus during the Soviet involvement in the country in the 1980s. 
Numerous authors believe it was the Soviet intervention which necessitated 
Pakistani support to various groups and that the success of this model would offer 
opportunities to Islamabad after the Soviet withdrawal. Pakistan clearly emerged 
from the Soviet defeat in a much strengthened strategic position as a power vacuum 
in Kabul emerged amongst the varied Mujahedeen factions leading to numerous 
internecine rivalries. Pakistan’s military, long the most powerful center of power in 
the country , recognized a unique opportunity in the early 1990s to extend 
Islamabad’s influence into Afghanistan and throughout the newly independent 
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Central Asian states by supporting select proxy groups amidst a growing Afghan 
civil conflict.21 
Yet, as some note, Pakistan’s support to various groups in Afghanistan may 
have first been rooted in its disastrous loss of East Pakistan – later an independent 
Bangladesh – and as early as the 1970s the ISI was relied upon by civilian and 
military governments to identify and support various Afghan political groups. C. 
Christine Fair notes Pakistan’s ties to these networks is rooted in the heady days of 
the Mujahedeen insurgency versus the Soviet Union but also has deeper historical 
precedents. She notes ties to these groups are based not on ideological affinity but 
rather Pakistan’s use of non-state groups as a legitimate tool of statecraft.22 
Pakistan’s prime interest in Afghanistan had always been to prevent the emergence 
of a government that was friendly to India and thereby create a strategic 
encirclement of Pakistan on both the eastern and western borders. The Soviet 
invasion of 1979 exacerbated Pakistan’s already tenuous strategic concerns and was 
a genuine threat to Pakistani interests in the region as Moscow and New Delhi 
enjoyed a close relationship throughout the Cold War.23 The withdrawal of Soviet 
forces in the late 1980s refocused Pakistan’s interest in developing a government 
friendly to its long-term interests.24  
                                                        
21 Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate: A State within a State?" JFQ: Joint Force 
Quarterly, no. 48 (2008): 104-110. 
22 Fair, C. Christine . "Pakistan's Relations with Central Asia: Is Past Prologue?" Journal of 
Strategic Studies 31, no. 2 (2008): 201-227. 
23 Price, Colin. "Pakistan: A Plethora of Problems." Global Security Studies 3, no. 1 (Winter2012 
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Feisal Khan points to the very creation of the state of Pakistan and the refusal 
by successive Afghan governments to recognize the Durand line – demarcating the 
border between modern Afghanistan and Pakistan and created by Imperial Britain 
through the 1919 Anglo-Afghan treaty – as well as constant fear of renewed Pashtu 
nationalism. Khan notes how Afghan support to an anti-Pakistan insurgency 
throughout its western border regions led to a low-level conflict between the two 
states. Even today, Khan believes these overlapping territorial claims affect 
Pakistan’s desire to influence Afghan politics through select militant groups. 
Following the disastrous 1971 war with India, Pakistan’s military recognizing the 
strategic necessity of ensuring Kabul would never become pro-Indian which would 
have the effect of surrounding an already precarious Pakistan.25 Well before the 
Soviet invasion of 1979, Khan details Pakistan’s covert support to pro-Pakistani 
political parties in Afghanistan. The Soviet invasion of the country and successful 
use of Afghan surrogates, “created the current aspect of Pakistan’s Afghan policy, as 
the Pakistani government realized that it could manipulate events in Afghanistan to 
suit its needs. 26  
Throughout the 1980s a common enemy in the Soviet Union strengthened 
the oftentimes-complicated relationship between Washington and Islamabad. Large 
amounts of Western aid was funneled through the premier Pakistani intelligence 
service, the Directorate General of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) where that 
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agency could then disburse materials and weapons to patrons of its choosing. Even 
after the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1989, Pakistan sought to influence events on 
the ground in Afghanistan through its support of select groups to remove the 
Communist backed Najibullah regime. Prior to the Soviet invasion however, 
Pakistan found itself in a tenuous position, which had long-plagued its military 
leaders. Drawing upon historical precedents, Afghanistan seemed a natural venue to 
advance Islamabad’s security interests.   
Nasreen Akhtar views Pakistani behavior towards Afghanistan in the 1990s 
as an extension of its covert efforts to halt Soviet advances further into South Asia. 
While the Soviet threat would be defeated through a combination of Pakistani, 
American and Saudi support to the disparate Mujahedeen movement, Pakistan 
harbored further designs on the country as well as residual fears of Indian 
influence.27 The Soviet Union and United States would gradually withdraw from 
their efforts in Afghanistan; Pakistan remained very much engaged seeking to 
ensure a coalition of Mujahedeen groups would be part of a post-Soviet invasion 
government. Akhtar notes Pakistan was unwilling to concede control over the 
groups and insisted on their representation in a new government as well as the 
removal of the communist backed Mohammed Najibullah.28 Akhtar views this 
support to the Mujahedeen and ensuing civil war as an extension of the Soviet 
invasion and a deeper Afghan internal war which began in the late 1970s. Pakistan’s 
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support to the groups in the 1990s ensured a measure control over the former 
Mujahedeen movement as well as to counter Indian and a resurgent Russian 
interest in the country.29  
Author Steve Coll also notes Pakistani military and intelligence officers had 
long feared encirclement by a pro-Moscow India and a communist government in 
Kabul. The 1979 Soviet invasion and creation of a puppet government in Kabul only 
confirmed long-held suspicions Pakistan was being slowly encircled by hostile 
powers.30 Following the withdrawal of Soviet combat forces in 1989, Pakistani 
leaders continued to harbor fears of a pro-Indian government in Kabul. This 
continuing suspicion of Indian intentions and a weak Najibullah government, which 
would lose its political patronage from the Soviet Union in early 1992, likely served 
as prime drivers for the ISI to continue its support of select Mujahedeen 
organizations. Coll notes in particular, the HIG emerged as a key recipient of 
Pakistani covert support as well as direct military assistance; in some instances 
Pakistani officers would command HIG attacks against the Najibullah regime and 
coordinate Pakistani artillery support.31 Ultimately, Coll views this support to 
militant organizations as a method to ensure Pakistan would enjoy commercial 
access to the newly independent states as well as to prevent a regime hostile to 
Pakistani political designs towards Afghanistan. These experiences served as 
valuable lessons for Pakistani decision makers and underscored the future utility of 
supporting proxy forces to ensure a future Afghanistan amenable to Islamabad’s 
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political and economic designs for Central Asia, which gained prominence during 
the 1990s following the independence of formerly Soviet Republics.  
Writing in the New Statesmen, William Dalrymple believes since the heady 
days of the Mujahedeen, Pakistan viewed the use of these Islamist militant groups 
as, “an ingenuous and cost-effective means of both dominating Afghanistan and 
bogging down the Hindu-dominated Indian Army in Kashmir.”32 Under this 
reasoning, Dalrymple believes Pakistani officials recognized the benefits of 
supporting proxy forces during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. This support was 
measured to check Indian influence in the region and promote Islamabad’s influence 
in a low-cost manner. While this accounts for contemporary Pakistani behavior with 
respect to India, it does not go farther in assessing the similarities between 
Islamabad’s strategic situation in the late 20th Century and the similarity between 
the Great Game politics of the 19th Century.   
Anatol Lieven makes clear, the relationship between the nascent Taliban 
movement of fundamentalist madrassa students and the ISI was not based on 
ideological grounds but rather a strategic calculation in which Islamabad needed to 
form a post-invasion government in Kabul amenable to its interests rather than 
Indian or Iranian designs.33 Similarly, Lawrence Ziring sees Pakistani involvement 
with various proxy forces as tied to Pakistan’s precarious strategic position, which 
was severely impacted by the tumultuous loss to India in 1971. The Soviet invasion 
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of Afghanistan served as a valuable opportunity to Islamabad to identify and 
support key surrogates while also giving it long-term political leverage in Kabul 
through the groups. This would ultimately allow Pakistan a chance to spread its 
influence to the north after having its eastern half separated into Bangladesh.34 
Similar to this argument is the position Pakistani leaders have often intervened in 
the affairs of Afghanistan through overt and covert support to various groups.35 
While these arguments take into account a deeper understanding of Pakistani 
history further analysis into parallels between British planners in the 19th Century, 
who faced similar circumstances, should be made to those of Pakistani military 
officers in the 1990s.  
 While existing literature touches upon various aspects of Pakistani support 
to militant organizations, most fail to take into account a long-standing rivalry, 
which has taken place in Afghanistan; first between the British Empire and Imperial 
Russia and later between Pakistan and India. Additional research is necessary to 
examine the historical linkages between Pakistani support to the Taliban and other 
militant organizations to prior strategic competitions amongst regional powers. 
Pakistan’s position within the larger struggle of power in South Asia has had an 
effect on its perceived security dilemma and impacted its relationship with 
numerous militant organizations in Afghanistan during the 1990s. Within this 
anarchic environment, successive Pakistani decision makers, military and civilian 
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alike, recognized the strategic importance of Afghanistan and the vital Pakistani 
security interests at stake.  
 
STRATEGIC DEPTH AND THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE 
Literature on Pakistani support to militant organizations also focuses on the 
concept of strategic depth in which Afghanistan provides a necessary and valuable 
venue to advance Islamabad’s security interests ultimately to ensure a friendly 
government along its western border. The concept of strategic depth can be traced 
to the late 19th Century struggle between the British Empire and Imperial Russia 
over influence through Central Asia. British policy makers calculated that they 
needed to delineate spheres of influence within Afghanistan to check Imperial 
Russian ambitions and prevent any advances on the crown jewel of the British 
Empire, India.  Little emphasis is currently placed on assessing the relevance of the 
British and Russian conflicts to the contemporary struggle between India and 
Pakistan. Pakistani decision makers drew upon these past precedents to inform 
their current decision-making in the post-Soviet invasion of Afghanistan with 
dramatic effect.  
Pakistan is confronted with a classical security dilemma in which it must 
seek to maximize its power in the face of an adversary to guarantee its security; 
Islamabad has long recognized the strategic importance of Afghanistan lest it be 
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surrounded by India.36   As Robert Glaser notes in his critique of Security Dilemma 
theory, “ states are uncertain about their adversaries motives, lacking confidence 
that others are pure security seekers.”37 Within this classic security dilemma British 
Imperial planners also recognized Afghanistan as a vital link to the then 
unconquered Central Asian states of Khiva, Bokhara, Khokand (today known as 
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan) as they faced a larger political 
and geo-strategic struggle with the Russian Empire.38  
Pakistan has always faced a difficult geo-strategic situation since its founding 
in the face of an overwhelming adversary that has distinct advantages in military 
capabilities as well as  in sheer population; India has always served as a perceived 
threat to Pakistani leaders on its eastern border with advantages of size and power. 
Since the creation of Pakistan in 1947 the British imposed Durand line has served as 
an enduring legacy of imperialism, separating the Pashtu ethnic group from 
between Afghanistan and Pakistan’s shared border.  Weinbaum and Harder believe 
the root of Pakistani interference in Afghanistan and support to various militant 
groups in the country can be traced to the unrecognized border between the two 
countries. Similar to the great game between Imperial Russia and the British Empire 
in the late Nineteenth Century, Pakistan’s support of various militant groups in the 
anarchic 1990s is linked to a deep historical precedents as Islamabad sought to 
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advance its interests into the Central Asian republics through war-torn 
Afghanistan.39  
Additionally, policy makers in Islamabad have long harbored fears on 
encirclement from a pro-Indian government in Kabul that would effectively 
surround Pakistan. The British concept of strategic depth in Afghanistan, applied by 
contemporary Pakistani decision makers, has long been recognized as a means to 
counter this fear as well as to provide a safe “rear area” for the military in the event 
of an overwhelming Indian military invasion.40  As a means of balancing against 
Indian power in the region, the development of a client-state relationship with a 
pro-Islamabad government in Kabul provides necessary depth to Pakistan. 
Ahmed Rashid highlights, throughout much of the 1980s and 1990s, Pakistan 
attempted to form an “Islamic bloc” of nations that would more effectively promote 
its political position in the region as well as to develop vital trade routes through the 
Central Asian states. This effort served to advance a pro-Islamabad agenda whereby 
Indian commercial and diplomatic interests would be mitigated by Islamabad’s 
close ties with a number of states to include a government in Kabul that was 
receptive if not amenable to Pakistani interests. Much like the great power politics 
of the 19th Century, a similar geo-strategic competition between India and Pakistan 
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emerged.41 Rashid links the relationship between Kabul and Islamabad’s security as 
he draws upon the historical precedents between the two but also highlights the 
precarious strategic environment in which Pakistan has long found itself.   
Pakistani leaders have also long believed it was necessary to develop what 
they term “Strategic Depth” as a means of strengthening Pakistan’s security. Sumit 
Ganguly and Nicholas Howenstein note, India has long maintained strong 
relationships with successive Afghan governments fueling Pakistani fears of 
strategic encirclement. “Even after Zahir's overthrow [the last monarch of 
Afghanistan, Mohammed Zahir Shah] in 1973, India managed to maintain close ties 
with the subsequent communist regimes. Contrary to popular belief, India was less 
than pleased with the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan. During the 
course of the Afghan war, India came to support Ahmed Shah Massoud's Northern 
Alliance because of its hostility toward the Pakistani-supported mujahedeen 
groups.”  
As Ganguly and Howenstein note, India’s support of the Northern Alliance 
was fueled by its own suspicions of Pakistani designs in the region and as part of the 
continuing rivalry between the two nations. This long-standing rivalry between 
India and Pakistan since the end of British rule has exacerbated tensions between 
the two countries while Afghanistan is often seen in a prism of a zero-sum scheme. 
The great power rivalries between Britain and Russia serve as a valuable model by 
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which to view Afghanistan as the contemporary powers of the region continued to 
exercise their power based upon similar calculations.  Further assessment of the 
parallels between British Imperial experiences in the region and Islamabad’s 
support to militant organizations will likely provide key insights, which underpin 
current Pakistani behavior in Afghanistan.   
Existing literature also highlights Pakistani fear of covert Indian assistance to 
the Baloch’s to be used a means to destabilize Pakistan’s western border and 
thereby force the Pakistani military to withdraw critical assets from the Indian 
border. To counter this perceived threat, Pakistan has consistently sought to 
destabilize certain ethnic groups in Afghanistan to prevent the emergence of a pro-
Indian government by supporting Pashtu groups such as the Taliban. As a 2009 
Council on Foreign Relations report notes,  “Pakistani security officials calculate that 
the Taliban offers the best chance for countering India's regional influence.”42 Ever 
fearful of strategic encirclement on the part of India, successive Pakistani 
governments have calculated that their relationships with certain political parties 
and militant movements in Afghanistan present the best option for ensuring 
strategic depth and preventing the emergence of a government that runs counter to 
Islamabad’s long-term national interests. The anarchy of the 1990s provided 
Islamabad a ready opportunity to influence Afghanistan and remake its national 
power structure in accordance to Pakistani interests.  
                                                        
42 Bajoria, Jayshree. "India-Afghanistan Relations." Aug 2009. Council on Foreign Relations. 
 31 
The Economist aptly noted in its October edition, “Pakistan's generals believe 
that, with an unfriendly government in place in Afghanistan, they need proxies to 
represent their interests there. Pakistan preferred to make common cause with 
ethnic Pashtu’s [who straddle the border] to guard against Tajiks, Uzbeks and 
Hazaras, whom the generals regarded as close to India, their arch-enemy.” The 
Economist” notes this paranoia was fed by scenario planning in which a hostile 
Afghan government, with a growing army now trained and equipped by the 
Americans, joins India to mount a two-front war against Pakistan, sandwiched 
between the two countries.”43 This fear amongst key Pakistani decision makers is 
key to understanding its view towards India and the rationale towards supporting 
select groups in Afghanistan.44 These factors influenced Pakistani military leaders 
throughout the 1990s as they sought to bolster the HIG and later Taliban 
movements as the best means to advance Pakistani interests in the wider Central 
Asian region.  
The ISI emerged as one of the pre-eminent intelligence services in the region 
and sought to apply lessons learned in the course of the Afghan-Soviet war to 
Kashmir and other venues. This would serve as a means to asymmetrically challenge 
its longtime rival India and advance Pakistani interests. 45This construct - support to 
groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and the Haqqani network - would be applied to 
Pakistan’s long conflict over Kashmir and successfully used as a tool in the war of 
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attrition over the disputed territory.46 Still more needs to be said regarding 
Pakistan’s long-standing conflict with India and how this dynamic effected its 
behavior in Afghanistan during the 1990s. It is likely that a combination of historical 
and strategic factors effected Islamabad’s behavior during that decade as well as 
today.  
Through a review of numerous articles it seems a predominance of literature 
states if Islamabad cannot outright control Afghanistan then it must seek to shape 
the political environment as much as possible through surrogate groups to ensure a 
secure eastern border.47 While numerous articles provide an analysis of Pakistan’s 
decision to support groups in the post-Soviet invasion, they fail to fully link this 
action with a wider historical precedents wherein Pakistani decision makers 
refused to recognize the Durand line and viewed Afghanistan as an integral part of 
the Islamic state and link this behavior to previous British actions in the region 




Pakistani involvement in Afghanistan has largely been based on its strategic 
environment and its fear of encirclement by a government in Kabul supportive of 
Indian interests in the region. Despite billions of dollars in American aid since 2001, 
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Pakistan has maintained a dangerous double game of publicly supporting the US 
global war on terrorism and covertly supporting elements of the Taliban movement, 
the HIG militant group as well as the Haqqani network.48 This complicated balancing 
act of dual support is based on a number of strategic and historic considerations 
that when judged against previous British behavior in the region reveal certain 
similarities. This speaks to the enduring relevancy of Afghanistan as a vital stage for 
great power projection; set amidst the Central Asian region and western Pakistani 
border, Afghanistan remains an enduring battleground between great power 
politics.  
Pakistani involvement in the Afghan – Soviet War would ultimately result in 
the defeat of the Soviet Union and its client state in Afghanistan under Mohammed 
Najibullah. The Pakistani ISI benefited as the prime interlocutor of Saudi and 
American covert aid, funneling this support to Islamabad’s selected recipients and 
creating a useful precedent for future Pakistani covert actions in the country. In the 
ensuing security vacuum, Pakistani intelligence began to recalibrate its support in 
the hope of creating an Afghan government more amenable to Islamabad’s 
interests.49  The intervening years of the 1990s and early 2000s would be a chaotic 
time for Afghanistan as former allies within the Mujahedeen movement would begin 
a savage civil war with shifting alliances and near complete devastation for Afghan 
society. Despite this instability, Pakistani planners rationally calculated an 
Afghanistan under militant groups such as the Hezb-e Islami and later Taliban 
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would promote Islamabad’s security interests in the face of growing Indian power. 
Similar to the strategic environment in which Imperial Britain found itself in the 
previous century, Pakistan recognized that to ensure its security it needed to 
maximize its power and ensure Afghanistan remained tilted towards Islamabad’s 
designs for the region.50 
 
BRITISH ACTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN 
The “Great Game” of the 19th Century pitted Great Britain and Imperial 
Russia against each other in a tense struggle for influence and control of Central Asia 
and provides a useful construct to analyze contemporary Pakistani behavior. In this 
historical struggle between regional powers, British and Russian planners viewed 
Afghanistan as a vital interest due to its proximity to India and relationship to the 
Central Asian states.51 To the Imperial Britain in particular, Afghanistan presented a 
crucial buffer by which to guard against any further Russian advance through the 
Central Asian states to ultimately establish a warm water port. At the beginning of 
the 19th Century, the Central Asian states were largely weak and divided amongst 
local “khanates” in which they existed in an almost feudal state. Russian ambition 
had long been to advance Moscow’s control farther south and extend its control 
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through this region.52 Alarmed by Moscow’s intent, British officers in India began to 
develop intelligence sources to better identify Russian progress. This competition 
for control would span much of the 19th Century and would only end with the 
Russian Revolution of 1917.53  
Britain’s ambitions for South Asia included not only modern-day Pakistan 
(then part of India and governed by British authorities) but also extended into 
Central Asia. Imperial planners recognized the strategic importance of Afghanistan 
and viewed it as a future state within the British Raj. Initially these designs were 
driven by Britain’s desire to control the loosely governed states to the north of 
Afghanistan loosely known as the Khanates (composed of modern Kazakhstan, 
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Kirgizstan).54 As the Russian Empire 
began to exert influence and ultimately control over this region, British authorities 
became concerned Afghanistan may fall under Moscow’s authority and present a 
strategic challenge to India.  Britain would attempt on three occasions to subjugate 
and control Afghanistan with no real success. These attempts were punctuated by 
three conflicts between Britain and Afghanistan known as the First (1839), Second 
(1878) and Third (1919) Anglo – Afghan wars.55  
                                                        
52 Becker, Seymour. “The Great Game: The History of an Evocative Phrase.” Asian Affairs 43, no. 
1 (2012): 64.  
53 Khalid, Iram. "The New Great Game in Afghanistan: Role of India (A Pakistani Perspective)." 
South Asian Studies 26, no. 2 (2011): 242.; 
Akbar, Zehra. “Central Asia: The New Great Game.” Accessed from: 
http://www.thewashingtonreview.org/articles/central-asia-the-new-great-game.html   
http://www.thewashingtonreview.org/articles/central-asia-the-new-great-game.html  
55 Singer, Andre. Lords of the Khyber: The Story of the North-West Frontier. London: Faber and 
Faber (1984): 192.  
 36 
Over the course of the Great Game, which lasted from roughly 1839 to 1919, 
Britain and Russia jockeyed for position and influence in Afghanistan and the wider 
region. While Imperial Russia could count the former Khanates as under its control, 
neither power would ultimately be able to control Afghanistan. Britain’s only real 
military success came after the Second Anglo – Afghan War as Afghanistan 
maintained its internal political structure but ceded its foreign affairs to British 
control.56In lieu of a convention victory over its adversary, Britain allowed 
Afghanistan the authority to conduct its domestice affairs while Britain would 
control its external relations. This in effect amounted to a proxy situation whereby 
Britain recognized the role a weak Afghanistan could play in stunting Russian 
ambitions so long as London maintained an upper hand. Imperial Russia would 
largely, albeit grudgingly, acknowledge Afghanistan as within the British sphere of 
influence. Russian military leaders were also aware of the near-constant difficulties 
the British Army faced when previously trying to control Afghanistan, which 
harbored a deep-seated disdain for foreign influences into its internal affairs. British 
policy adapted to this reality and rather than control the country directly settled on 
controlling Afghanistan’s external affairs. The country would continue to serve as a 
strategic buffer between the competing great powers into the 20th Century while 
also maintaining its sovereignty.57     
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 Since its founding in 1947, Pakistan has been faced with an overwhelming 
adversary in India which enjoys numerical superiority in military force and a more 
favorable geographic position. Additionally, Pashtun nationalism in Pakistan’s 
Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) and Federally Administered Tribal Area 
(FATA) has long sought to unite Afghan and Pakistani tribes, split as a result of the 
British imposed Durand Line. Cognizant of these realities, Pakistani leaders 
democrats and autocrats alike, have sought to project influence into Afghanistan to 
check Indian ambitions in the region.   
 Throughout the two histories of Pakistan and Afghanistan, Islamabad has 
looked with caution towards Afghan demands in the NWFP and Kabul’s insistence 
that the Durand line is an arbitrary border. Moreover, Islamabad has long viewed 
Afghanistan as more a client state than a legitimate neighbor; a space where 
Pakistani influence should be advanced to create strategic depth as well as to guard 
against great power influence from Iran, Russia and most importantly India. The 
independence of the Central Asian states following the collapse of the Soviet Union 
provided Pakistan a unique opportunity to project its influence. Support to militant 
organizations, which had proved their value during the Soviet invasion, provided 
Pakistan a new tool which to ensure protected its interests in any Afghan 
government. If successful this would have the effect of thwarting or hedging against 
Indian and Iranian political and economic designs.58  
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Pakistan’s early involvement with the Taliban movement can be traced to its 
successful involvement supporting elements of the Mujahedeen movement during 
the 1980s. The ISI emerged from the conflict as one of the pre-eminent intelligence 
services in the region and sought to apply lessons learned in the course of the 
Afghan-Soviet war to Kashmir as a means to asymmetrically challenge its longtime 
rival India. This construct, support to groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and the 
Haqqani network, would be applied to Pakistan’s long conflict over Kashmir and 
successfully used as a tool in the war of attrition over the disputed territory.59 
These ties to the Taliban and Hekmatyr networks go back to the heady days 
of the Mujahedeen insurgency versus the Soviet Union. Used as a successful tool to 
advance its larger national security interests, this support to proxies would be 
applied to other insurgent and terrorist networks. These ties to groups are based 
not on ideological affinity but rather Pakistan’s view of non-state groups as a 
legitimate tool of statecraft. Rather than confront an overwhelming enemy such as 
the Soviet Union or in a more contemporary context India, Pakistan relies on these 
groups to execute an asymmetric conflict where the advantages of overwhelming 
military strength are mitigated by tactics, terrain and possible political blowback.60  
Throughout the 1980s the oftentimes-complicated relationship between 
Washington and Islamabad was strengthened by a common enemy in the Soviet 
                                                        
59 Ganguly, Sumit, and S. Paul Kapur. "The Sorcerer's Apprentice: Islamist Militancy In South 
Asia." The Washington Quarterly 33, no. 1 (2010): 47-59.; 
Rashid, Ahmed. Taliban the Power of Militant Islam in Afghanistan and Beyond.. London: I.B. 
Tauris & Co., 2002.  
60 Siddiqa, Ayesha. "Pakistan's Counterterrorism Strategy: Separating Friends from Enemies." 
Washington Quarterly 34, no. 1 (2011): 154. 
 39 
Union.61 Large amounts of Western aid was funneled through the ISI where that spy 
agency could then disburse materials and weapons to patrons of its choosing. 
Pakistan’s continual support to militant groups post 1989 was designed to influence 
events on the ground in Afghanistan through its support of select groups. These 
efforts were ultimately successful as the government in Kabul fell by 1992 but 
quickly led to a devastating civil war between formerly allied elements of the 
mujahedeen movement.62 
Despite the withdrawal of Soviet conventional forces in Afghanistan the 
puppet government under Mohamed Najibullah posed an impediment to Pakistan’s 
long-term designs for the region. Pakistan decision makers calculated that to 
advance their security and economic agendas they needed to install a government 
composed of Mujahedeen fighters that would be more supportive of Islamabad’s 
policies. Even without Soviet support the Najibullah government maintained a 
valiant defense in the face of continued Pakistani support to Gulbudin Hekmatyr and 
Jalaluddin Haqqani. Pakistan also maintained a suspicion that certain members of 
the Mujahedeen movement such as Ahmed Shah Massoud and Rashid Dostom would 
be amenable to support from India. Pakistani leaders harbored fears that 
Afghanistan would once again be supportive of Russian and Indian designs.  
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Ultimately, Pakistan’s support of militant organizations through the 1990s 
was based upon a combination of historic and strategic considerations as a means of 
guaranteeing Islamabad’s security. As John Mearshimer writes, states consistently 
capitalize on opportunities to increase their power and that this dynamic explains 
much of great-power behavior. While these groups were contrary to Western 
interests and drew international admonishment, Pakistan recognized it had few 
options to advance its interests and saw groups such as the Hezb-e-Islami and later 
the Taliban as the least worst option amongst an anarchic security environment in 
the region.  
The relationship between the nascent Taliban movement and the ISI was 
determined by a simple strategic calculation that Islamabad needed to form a post-
invasion government in Kabul amenable to its interests rather than to Indian or 
Iranian designs. To achieve these objectives, Pakistan supported several militant 
organizations, preferring Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and his network due to the previous 
relationship during the Soviet invasion.63 Hekmatyar proved a willing recipient of 
Pakistani covert aid but would prove to be unable to capture Kabul, Pakistani 
military and intelligence officials concluded that his network could not deliver a 
stable Afghanistan and began shifting their covert support towards the nascent 
Taliban movement of southern Afghanistan by 1994.64 This support should be seen 
within the larger context of South Asian great power politics. Similar to British 
views of Afghanistan as a necessary security buffer against Imperial Russia, 
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Pakistani leaders have long understood the strategic importance of Afghanistan to 





STRATEGIC DEPTH: AFGHANISTAN’S ROLE IN PAKISTANI SECURITY 
British planners fearing an encroaching Tsarist Russia sought to protect the 
crown jewel of the Empire by ensuring Russia would be denied a warm-water port 
and any opportunities to control Afghanistan for much of the 19th Century. Russian 
officials similarly feared British designs into Central Asia and sought to counter 
increasing British commercial activity in the Khanates.65 Paralleling this dynamic of 
uncertainty, Pakistani and Indian leaders have long feared each other’s intention in 
Afghanistan and exercised varying degrees of actions to counter this threat. These 
competitions provide clear case studies for the classical security dilemma. As 
previously mentioned, this paradigm within international affairs is characterized by 
mutual distrust and uncertainty between two nation-states. In certain cases this 
creates miscalculation or efforts to maximize a state’s comparative power.66 
Constant British and Russian uncertainty led to a number of costly wars between 
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the British Empire and Afghanistan none of which would allow London to exert its 
desired state of colonization.  
Pakistan’s involvement with the Taliban as well HIG was driven primarily not 
out of a common Islamic ideology but rather Islamabad’s pragmatic calculation that 
it must maintain influence in Afghanistan to project strategic depth. The concept of 
strategic depth can be traced to the late 19th Century struggle between the British 
Empire and Imperial Russia over influence through Central Asia. British policy 
makers calculated that they needed to delineate spheres of influence within 
Afghanistan to check Imperial Russian ambitions and prevent any advances on the 
crown jewel of the British Empire, India. Afghanistan emerged as a zone where 
British and Russian strategists constantly asserted power through direct 
intervention or through co-option or cooperation of the local governments.67 
Pakistani leaders of the 1990s were faced with a similar set of circumstances in 
which a weak government in Kabul would likely serve as a venue for regional 
competition between Islamabad and New Delhi.  
The concept of Pakistani strategic depth took on additional meaning 
following the disastrous war with India in 1971. During this conflict, Pakistan lost 
control over the entirety of its eastern half of the country and suffered a long-lasting 
humiliation against its archrival. To counter this defeat and the overcome its 
geographical vulnerabilities, Pakistani military and political officials recognized the 
strategic importance of Afghanistan in any future conflict with India. Starting with 
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the military dictatorship of Zia, Pakistani intelligence began to cultivate 
relationships that would allow Islamabad to influence Afghan policy in its favor.68  
British Imperial planners were similarly faced with the reality that 
Afghanistan would be difficult to control and would likely not accept direct British 
authority. In response to continued Russian encroachment into Central Asia and a 
delegation that sought to create a new relationship between Kabul and Moscow, the 
British military would launch a preemptive attack against Afghanistan. Fully aware 
of their inability to pacify the country in the First Anglo – Afghan War, British 
military objectives called for several decisive victories and an assertion of British 
primacy in the country; Afghanistan would maintain control over its domestic 
affairs while London would control Kabul’s external relations.69 
Pakistan’s long standing conflicts with India and its precarious geographic 
position underscored the necessity of exerting influence into Afghanistan lest India 
develop friendly relations with Kabul. This strategic scenario creates similar 
circumstances in which Pakistani planners exerted as much influence as possible 
into Afghanistan to prevent the emergence of a pro-Indian government in that 
country as well as to ensure its economic and commercial interests could advance 
into the Central Asian republics.  
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While the end of the Cold War was greeted as the end of history by some 
Western commentators, Pakistani decision makers viewed the defeat of the Soviet 
Union as an opportunity to create an “Islamic Bloc” of nations in the newly 
independent Central Asian states.70 This security vacuum created structural 
incentives for Pakistan to extend its influence into Afghanistan as a means of 
creating strategic depth and furthering its security interests. Viewed through this 
construct, Pakistan’s support to various militant organizations in the 1990s was 
entirely logical based upon historic and strategic considerations. Similar to British 
actions in the late 19th century, Islamabad recognized its security was dependent 
upon an amenable government in Kabul to counter a peer competitor. Additionally, 
these actions align with a structural realist view of international relations in which 
states view maximizing their power as the ultimate guarantee of their survival.71  
The rise of the Taliban movement in the mid 1990s out of southern 
Afghanistan and their success against the Rabbani government suddenly changed 
the operational dynamic in the Afghan Civil War. While it is easy to speculate that 
this was a direct result of Pakistani patronage Ahmed Rashid notes that the Afghan 
Taliban movement did enjoy unparalleled access to the Pakistani levers of power 
they were by no means a tool of or subservient to the ISI. While the Pakistani 
government was clearly supporting the Taliban movement with material and 
military advisors the Taliban were more a Pashtu based fundamentalist movement 
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that sought to implement a more austere social order amongst the lawlessness of 
Afghanistan.72  
Islamabad calculated that given its tenuous strategic environment the HIG 
and later the Taliban presented the most readily accessible factions with whom to 
support even if the ISI did not share an ideological affinity for the fundamentalist 
movements. While it is impossible to define the exact amount of aid given by 
Pakistan to the Taliban it is clear that a significant amount of military aid in the form 
of logistical support and expertise was given to advance Islamabad’s interests in 
Afghanistan. This aid went so far as to place Pakistani military officers in a lead 
advising role for the sometimes-inexperienced Taliban field commanders.73 
The Afghan Taliban, unlike the Pakistani movements of the same name, 
would ultimately receive large amount of aid in the form of official diplomatic and 
economic support as well as covert training and weapons material. “The Taliban 
who governed Afghanistan from 1996–2001 had strong ties to Pakistan, both official 
and unofficial: they formed their identity in Pakistani schools and refugee camps, 
received funding and support from Islamabad that enabled their rise, and had close 
bilateral relations with their patrons after they seized power. Their agenda, 
however, was primarily a national one, and it remained so even after they were 
toppled and driven into the wilderness by the United States in 2001–2.” Though a 
fundamentalist movement with a revisionist interpretation of Islam, Pakistan 
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recognized a valuable asset in the Taliban that could be co-opted and utilized to 
advance Islamabad’s long-term interests in the region.74  
Pakistan leaders, civilian and military alike, have continually sought to 
ensure Kabul did not emerge as a key supporter of India. The withdrawal of Soviet 
forces in the late 1980s refocused Pakistan’s interest in developing a government 
friendly to its long-term interests.75 As Pakistan was able to score a strategic victory 
in the 1990s with the rise of the Taliban movement they also gained a government 
that was more amenable to Pakistani efforts in the region. The success of the 
Taliban movement in defeating the government of Massoud forced the Indian 
government to close its diplomatic facilities in Afghanistan resulting in a serious 
political setback for New Delhi.76 
Pakistan’s strategic partnership with the Taliban presented a number of 
complex problems as Taliban brutality in the western Afghan city of Herat nearly 
pushed the regime to war with neighboring Iran.77 Few nations other than Pakistan, 
Saudi Arabian and the United Arab Emirates recognized the legitimacy of the 
Taliban. As author Craig Baxter notes “The Taliban regime that was essentially 
security oriented did not earn any international support for reconstruction of the 
country. Instead, there was a sentiment of passive hostility in that region against 
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Pakistan for the support it had given to the Taliban.78 The United States, European 
countries, and even China, its closest ally, were,  “all offended by Pakistan's failure to 
influence the policies of the Taliban on any issue.”  Yet Pakistan calculated that 
whatever costs were associated with its involvement with the Taliban government 
were worth bearing to hedge against any possible Indian encirclement in the 
region.79  
 Pakistan’s behavior in Afghanistan and in its relations with other Central 
Asian states underscore its desire to develop “depth” as a means to protect its 
influence and check the ambition of Iran and India. This also allows Pakistan to 
balance against its principal threat India and ensure its largely unguarded western 
border remains amenable to Islamabad’s interests. Despite international 
condemnation for its oftentimes-sustained relationships with militant groups in 
Afghanistan, Pakistan recognizes that it must maintain these connections to protect 
its vital security interests. Pakistan covert support for certain militant groups and 
its diplomatic efforts to ensure these groups are represented in a larger Afghan 
political process would ensure that Pakistani interests not Indian are represented in 
a future Afghan government.80 This effort served to advance a pro-Islamabad 
agenda whereby Indian commercial and diplomatic interests would be mitigated by 
Islamabad’s close ties with a number of states to include a government in Kabul that 
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was receptive if not amenable to Pakistani interests.81 Recognizing that the defeat 
and eventual collapse of the Soviet Union provided a unique moment of opportunity 
for it as Pakistani diplomats, intelligence officers and prominent businesses sought 
to counter the rising power of India. Much like the great power politics of the 19th 
Century, a similar geo-strategic competition between India and Pakistan emerged.  
 Historically India has been open to working with numerous governments in 
Kabul that were dominated by Islamist militant groups such as the Northern 
Alliance. Similar to Pakistan’s relations with certain groups, India’s relationship was 
based around opposition to a Pashtu led government that would be backed by 
Islamabad. Ganguly and Howenstein further note that the long-standing rivalry 
between India and Pakistan since the end of British rule has exacerbated tensions 
between the two countries were Afghanistan is often seen in a zero-sum scheme. As 
discussed earlier in the paper, similar to the great power rivalries between Britain 
and Russia, Afghanistan has served as a proxy battlefield between the contemporary 
great powers of the region.  During the course of the Cold War, India outreach to 
Pashtu nationalist groups would allow New Delhi to occupy the Pakistani military 
on both the eastern and western borders.   
 
SUPPORT TO MILITANT ORGANIZATIONS: A LOW-COST ALTERNATIVE TO 
CONVENTIONAL CONFLICT 
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Today American and international forces led by the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) remain frustrated at their inability to quell a resurgent Taliban 
insurgency throughout much of Afghanistan. Washington has attempted to use its 
influence and military aid as leverage toward Islamabad in an effort to stem the 
Taliban movement and as a means of stabilizing Afghanistan. Recognizing that 
Islamabad’s established relationships with the various factions in the Taliban 
movement are key to a future political solution, U.S. and NATO leaders believe 
Pakistan’s security establishment can be dissuaded from future support to the 
Taliban movement. Upon a further examination of Pakistani support to these 
groups, Western policy makers would be wise to view Islamabad’s support to 
militant organizations through a strategic prism in which Islamabad seems unlikely 
to change its current behavior. While contrary to Western interests and a wider 
struggle against fundamentalist movements, Pakistan’s support to militant 
organizations is based on a cold but pragmatic calculus in recognition of its 
precarious strategic environment vis a vis India.  
Cognizant of the British Imperial experience in the region one hundred years 
prior, Pakistan’s intelligence and military leaders recognized Afghanistan as a vital 
interest to Pakistani security. Given the lack of a national government following the 
Soviet withdrawal and the tenuous position of the Najibullah government, 
Islamabad recognized the disparate Mujahedeen movements as its best chance to 
advance its security interests. Always aware of competing Indian interests, the HIG 
and later Taliban movement were seen as the best means by which to create a pro-
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Pakistani government in Kabul.82 If successful, this would have the effect of 
guaranteeing security on Pakistan’s western border and enhancing its commercial 
and political advances into Central Asia. 
Pakistan’s support of the Mujahedeen and later Taliban movement of the 
1990s provided a valuable number of lessons for Islamabad’s decision makers; The 
costs of covertly supporting a surrogate were far fewer than overt Pakistani military 
and diplomatic involvement. Pakistan gained a valuable ally in the Taliban and 
despite a lack of shared ideological interests the Taliban government served as a 
valuable patron for Islamabad’s wider interests in the region.   ISI support to the 
Taliban movement in the 1990s and early 2000s served Islamabad’s interests well 
by thwarting Iranian and Indian efforts to advance their respective interests.  
This support to militant organizations also provides a low-cost option to 
Pakistan while reducing the possibility of outright conflict with its peer competitor 
India. The ISI’s covert support to the Mujahedeen in the 1980s served as a valuable 
model by which to challenge Indian influence in the region. Over time this construct 
would also be applied to Jammu and Kashmir where since the independence of both 
India and Pakistan a low-level conflict has continued between the competing 
countries.83   
 Pakistan also feared that covert Indian assistance to the Baloch’s could be 
used a means to destabilize its western border and thereby force the Pakistani 
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military to withdraw critical assets from the Indian border. To counter this 
perceived threat, Pakistan has consistently sought to destabilize certain ethnic 
groups in Afghanistan to prevent the emergence of a pro-Indian government by 
supporting Pashtu groups such as the Taliban. As a 2010 Council on Foreign 
Relations report notes,  “Pakistani security officials calculate that the Taliban offers 
the best chance for countering India's regional influence.”84 Ever fearful of strategic 
encirclement on the part of India, successive Pakistani governments will likely 
calculate that their relationships with certain political parties and militant 
movements in Afghanistan present the best option for ensuring strategic depth and 
preventing the emergence of a government that runs counter to Islamabad’s long-
term national interests.   
Pakistani decision makers will likely re-evaluate the lessons of their past 
support for a Taliban-led government in Kabul and conclude that this support 
advances their interests. The Taliban will likely remain an important asset for 
Pakistan leaders and most especially the ISI who are ever fearful of a Kabul 
government amenable to Indian interests. Moreover, as American aid to Pakistan is 
likely to decrease following a drawdown in conventional forces and Washington and 
Islamabad reevaluate their relationship, the ISI will likely be called on once again by 
the military elite to expand their relationship with the Taliban. This will be done to 
ensure that Islamabad’s interest in a friendly government is advanced and Iranian 
and Indian efforts are checked.  
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The costs of confronting an adversary that has military and economic 
advantages through the use of trusted surrogates allows a weaker state such as 
Pakistan to level the playing field and turn weaknesses into strengths. The 
suspicions between New Delhi and Islamabad date to the founding of the two 
countries. Pakistan’s relationships with militant and terrorist organizations draw 
directly upon the ISI’s success in battling the Soviet Union and the Communist 
government of Afghanistan.85 Absent military parity, Pakistan will likely continue to 
view a friendly government in Afghanistan as a strategic necessity and a key venue 
to prevent Indian encirclement.   
 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE IMPLICATIONS 
 
Following an eventual withdrawal of US and Coalition forces, Pakistan’s 
strategic interests will remain largely unchanged from what they were in the 1990s, 
with a constant suspicion of Iranian, Russian and Indian designs in Afghanistan and 
the wider Central Asian region.86 As a result, Pakistan’s support for militant groups 
and its desire to significantly shape or create a friendly government in Kabul fit into 
its strategic vision for the region. If the past serves as prologue then the situation in 
Afghanistan following a withdrawal of Western forces will closely mirror the 
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Afghanistan of the 1990s with shifting coalitions amongst the various ethnic groups 
and Pakistan as well as the other regional great powers.87  
Pakistan’s involvement with the Taliban as well as violent groups such as the 
Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) in the 1990s was driven primarily not out of a 
common Islamic ideology but rather Islamabad’s pragmatic calculation that it must 
maintain influence in Afghanistan to project strategic depth. The withdrawal of 
Soviet troops and a weak coalition government in Kabul allowed Islamabad an 
opportunity to promote its political and security interests into the country as well as 
expand commercial influence to the newly independent states of Central Asia.88 
Amidst this security vacuum, Pakistani leaders recognized that to fully take 
advantage of a weak Afghanistan - in the face of numerous warring factions - select 
militant organizations provided the best means by which to exert influence into 
Afghanistan. One hundred years prior, British Imperial planners were faced with a 
similar set of circumstances viewing Afghanistan as a stage for a larger geo-strategic 
struggle with Imperial Russia. Similar to the British Imperial experience in the 19th 
Century, Pakistan was faced with a weak-neighboring state, which would serve as a 
venue for competing regional powers.  
Given this complicated security environment, Pakistani decision makers 
tactfully shifted their support to a number of militant organizations in Afghanistan 
throughout the 1990s in order to advance Islamabad’s security interests. Ever 
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fearful of being encircled by India on both borders Pakistan’s security officials made 
a calculated decision to provide lethal aid to Afghan militant groups in order to 
create or influence a future government in Kabul amenable to Islamabad’s interests. 
Pakistani involvement in Afghanistan has largely been based on its precarious 
strategic environment and fear of encirclement by a government in Kabul 
supportive of Indian interests in the region.89 Pakistan calculated its security 
interests would be best served through an alliance with numerous Afghan militant 
organizations thereby ensuring India would not be able encircle Pakistan and deny 
it strategic depth in the face of an outright conflict.  
 US policy makers have been continually frustrated with attempts to convince 
Pakistani decision makers to withdraw their support to militant groups in 
Afghanistan and support a comprehensive regional solution. Yet, a wide array of 
public and private musings within Western capitals seem to acknowledge that 
Pakistani fears of strategic encirclement and a desire to promote their interests 
through surrogates in Afghanistan may be too substantial to change Islamabad’s 
behavior. To be sure, Pakistan and India remain deep enemies with fundamentally 
different political systems and divergent national interests. Their respective 
histories are laced with sharp periods of competition as well as covert and overt 
hostility. These differences may be too much to bridge absent security guarantees 
that would be accepted in both New Delhi and Islamabad.  
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 Moreover, Islamabad’s behavior in Afghanistan since the Soviet invasion 
belies that Pakistan values that country as a valuable asset that can be used to 
improve its strategic position in the region, advance its commercial and diplomatic 
agenda. Pakistan’s successful relationship with the Taliban throughout the 1990s 
will likely be deepened with the withdrawal of Coalition forces as Islamabad 
recognizes that it must negotiate based upon the realities in Afghanistan with a less 
than desirable partner lest India or Iranian influence grows in that country.   
 The depth of Pakistani support to the Taliban and HIG networks may never 
be fully known outside the guarded corridors of the vaunted ISI. Yet Pakistan seems 
to be conducting a set of actions hat are intended to shape Afghanistan for the long 
term similar to their policies of the 1990s. American and Western staying power in 
the region are growing increasingly thin after 10 years of protracted conflict and 
countless high profile attacks against symbols of Western influence in the country. 
Pakistan clearly understands that it must have a substantial role in the region 
following the departure of these forces. To do so, it has likely calculated that it must 
work with the Afghan Taliban as well as deepen relationships its has historically 
relied upon to ensure that its strategic position in the region is not further 
weakened. As British planners of the 19th Century recognized Afghanistan’s strategic 
relationship to Central Asia, Pakistan has likely calculated the benefits of supporting 
the Taliban and other militant groups outweighs any costs as this provides 
Islamabad the best chance to ensure its security interests are met.  
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Current US policy towards Afghanistan states that by 2014 a substantial 
number of American troops deployed as a result of the 2009 surge will be 
withdrawn and replaced by a larger Afghan National Army force of some 400,000 
troops. Yet most foreign policy scholars believe substantial Western diplomatic 
support, material aid and clandestine presence will remain in Afghanistan for the 
next decade. In the absence of a large US and International Security Assistance 
Forces presence Afghanistan will likely emerge once again as a proxy battlefield 
between competing Iranian, Indian and Pakistani interests. 90 Pakistan will likely 
recreate or further enhance existing relationships with certain elements of the 
Taliban movement and their long-time patron Gulbuddin Hekmatyar to ensure a 
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Chapter 2: Revolutionary Outreach: An Examination of Iran’s Support to Lebanese 
Hezbollah  
 Research Question: How did the nature of the anarchic international system 
and the character of Iran’s post-revolutionary government affect Tehran’s decision 
to support Lebanese Hezbollah as a strategic proxy force?   
Introduction 
 
The Russian Revolution of 1917 and the Iranian Revolution of 1979 are often 
cited as transformative events in world history in which the pre-existing status quo 
was replaced through the formation of revolutionary governments. In the case of 
Iran, the Shia-theocratic forces, which would eventually consolidate their power to 
the determinant of the more moderate/pragmatic factions of the revolution, would 
come to challenge both the Western-backed monarchies of the Middle East as well 
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as the Arab secular regimes of Iraq and Egypt. This abrupt change in the character of 
the Iranian state would challenge the decade’s old balance of power in the Persian 
Gulf and upend the security calculus of the region while also having long-standing 
implications on American involvement in the region.  
Similar to the immediate years following the Bolshevik victory and 
consolidation of power, revolutionary Iran sought to export it’s unique brand of 
ideology outside its borders as a means of enhancing its national power as well as to 
burnish its credentials. In the case of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the new political 
structure, which would come to be known as the Guardianship of the Jurist, 
combined elements of Shia theology with revolutionary tactics previously employed 
by the Bolshevik vanguards of the early 20th Century.  Former Central Intelligence 
Agency Officer Robert Baer likens the theocratic government of Iran as eminently 
pragmatic and in even in the heady days following the successful revolution, the 
Ayotallah’s recognized they would be unable to bring their version of Islamic 
government to the country overnight. The construct they would create recognized 
the need to adapt to Iranian society while also proper adherence to Islamic law. As 
Baer notes the Shia jurisprudent was, “not far from Plato’s rule of philosopher 
king.”91   
The new revolutionary government would also seek to export its version of 
government to what it viewed as the corrupt apostate’s of the region starting first 
with Iraq. Starting in 1979 the Iranian regime sought to export the Islamic 
revolution, or at least the Shia interpretation, throughout the world. Iranian scholar 
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Said Arjomand notes, “in October 1981, the Iranian Foreign Minister, Mir-Hossein 
Musavi, set up a committee to determine the basis of foreign policy from an 
ideological perspective, and drew up plans for an Islamic front worldwide.” This 
would result in several Iranian-backed political organizations throughout the 
Middle East to include Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Iraq. By 1982 the military and 
political vanguard of the revolution, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), 
had begun a covert involvement in the Lebanese Civil War.92    
 In the years after the consolidation of power, Iranian decision makers and 
security officials began a complex involvement with the minority Shia communities 
of Lebanon amidst that country’s disastrous civil war. The almost 15 year conflict 
would see Western, Israeli and Arab support for various proxy forces and political 
movements as well as outright deployment of conventional forces. Iran’s decision to 
support the country’s Shia communities in the early 1980s was made amidst a costly 
conventional conflict with Iraq as Saddam Hussein sought to strengthen his own 
credentials in the Arab world by invading the Iranian oil-rich region of Khuzestan 
and containing the revolutionary government in Tehran. In the face of a 
technologically superior ally in Iraq and diplomatic isolation, Tehran embarked on a 
covert undertaking to secretly support a nascent militant group in eastern 
Lebanon.93  
Though this group had once been affiliated with the more mainstream Amal, 
the new organization, which called itself, Hezbollah (literally party of god) sought to 
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challenge the Israeli and Syrian factions of the Lebanese Civil War. Since this time 
Western observers have struggled to accurately understand Iranian support to 
proxy forces.94 Since the successful revolution over the pro-Western Shah Reza 
Pahlavi, Islamic Iran has sought to continually challenge the existing status quo in 
the Middle East. A 2009 Jane’s country risk assessment noted “Iran’s strategic 
doctrine is shaped by its regional political aspirations, threat perceptions and desire 
to preserve the legacy of the Islamic revolution.”95  
 Conventional interpretations regarding Iranian involvement in the Lebanese 
Civil War largely focus on common Shia linkages between Hezbollah and the Iranian 
government.96 While Lebanon had often been the venue for previous proxy wars, 
the Shia minority may have seemed a logical surrogate for Iranian largesse. 
However, little literature focuses on the structure of the international system and 
whether or not it provides certain incentives for governments, revolutionary or 
otherwise, to engage in a proxy war as a means of enhancing national power. The 
following review of applicable literature will attempt to highlight the key arguments 
to explain Iranian support to Lebanese Hezbollah. I will first review literature, 
which emphasizes the unique nature of the Iranian government as a key driver for 
its behavior. Second, I will review the two theoretical outlines of neo-realism 
divided between defensive and offensive realism and apply the key tenets of these 
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theories to Iranian behavior, specifically its support to Hezbollah, to better 




ANARCHIC INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM AS AN UNDERLYING ASSUMPTION 
 Amongst international relations scholars a common assumption exists which 
largely posits the international system between nation-states is anarchic. This 
anarchy is defined as a system in which no force, or supra-national entity, exists to 
govern the behavior of states. While international institutions such as the United 
Nations can sometimes serve as arbiters between feuding states, the lack of a central 
authority above individual states creates a highly unpredictable environment in 
which states must assume a worst-case scenario and seek to maximize either their 
power or their security. 97 
In the Theory of International Politics, Kenneth Waltz believes the prime 
driver for state action is to understand a balancing against power from an opposing 
state or an alliance of states. Waltzian theory would lead to a rejuvenation within 
realist circles and a modification on the more classical strains of the theory. Waltz’s 
emphasis upon assessing state’s threats and relative power distribution would place 
analysis at a structural level vice the classical realist approach which emphasized 
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the role of human motivation, and a desire for power as the key driver for a state’s 
behavior.98 While both versions of realism acknowledge anarchy as the constant 
state of international affairs, structural realists believed systemic constraints and 
incentives were the key to understanding why states (democratic or autocratic) 
conducted certain behaviors.  
 Writing in the International Studies Review, F. Gregory Gause states, “The 
Middle East is a “hard case” for the neo- realist theory of balancing, for he (Walt) 
discerns numerous bandwagoning incentives in the region related to transnational 
ideologies and identities.99  In this paper I will seek to apply neo-realist theory 
(structural realism) to better understand Iranian support to Lebanese Hezbollah 
and identify structural incentive that better explain Tehran’s behavior. Through a 
discussion of the competing versions of neorealism and an understanding of the 
structural constraints imposed on the Islamic Republic, we may be able to better 
understand the prime drivers for Iranian behavior as it relates to this proxy force 
while also seeking to understand the geo-strategic environment in which the 
revolutionary government found itself.  
Both offensive and defensive realists recognize structural considerations as 
key to understanding behavior. However, offensive realism largely posit states seek 
to constantly maximize their power as the only true guarantee of security whereas 
defensive realists would note a state’s actions would be best understood by 
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recognizing a need to seek security before expansionism.100 This leads to either a 
behavior of bandwagoning with another state or balancing against a common 
competitor or actions which seek to change the balance of power in favor of the 
revisionist state (the state which seeks to maximize its power). Both theories 
believe it is the structure of the international system and a state’s relation to its 
peers, which provides certain incentives for either offensive or defensive action. 
Simply put, when states feel threatened they will either seek to counter their 
adversaries or balance against a potential threat.101 
Perhaps the leading contemporary offensive realist, John Mearshimer 
succinctly captures the key tenets of this theory when he states, “Given the difficulty 
of determining how much power is enough for today and tomorrow, great powers 
recognize that the best way to ensure their security is to achieve hegemony now, 
thus eliminating any possibility of a challenge by another great power. Only a 
misguided state would pass up an opportunity to be the hegemon in the system 
because it thought it already had sufficient power to survive.”102 
Similarly, defensive realists acknowledge the preeminence of anarchy within 
the international system but diverge from offensive theorists believing state’s 
actions should be assessed through an understanding of balancing against perceived 
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risk.103 While both theoretical camps believe states seek to guarantee their security 
through certain actions, defensive realists would point to those actions which 
enhance a states security in the face of a threat vice promoting or enhancing 
national power at first blush as offensive theorists would contend.  
In light of a predominance of literature which focuses on the Islamist/Shia 
fundamentalist nature of the Iranian regime, a structural analysis of Tehran’s 
behavior may prove to better identify additional drivers for the regime’s behavior. A 
review and discussion of Iranian behavior prior to the revolution and possible 
symmetries in its actions after the fall of the Shah may also identify the role 




CHARACTER OF THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT   
The nascent post-revolutionary Iranian government offered an alternative to 
prevailing Western and Soviet backed economic and political models. Ayatollah 
Khomeini and other Shia clerics in Iran had formed the theoretical concept of Iran’s 
revolutionary government, the guardianship of the jurist, decades earlier.104 Broadly 
speaking, this form of government placed an emphasis on the wisdom of the learned 
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Imams as representatives of god.  Former Presidential Aide, Gary Sick believes the 
cardinal rule American decision makers should fully appreciate with regards to Iran 
is Tehran’s behavior should be analyzed in full appreciation of the domestic drivers 
for its behavior. Also turning to the unique theocratic nature of its government Sick 
notes, “The supreme goal of Ayatollah Khomeini and his associates is to assure the 
continuation of the theocratic rule and to preserve the legitimacy of the new 
regime.” In this view, Iranian national security and the survival of the theocratic 
regime are closely tied to regime preservation. Therefore, Iranian actions, 
specifically its support to Hezbollah, should be assessed in light of the state’s 
necessity in maintaining its particular form of government.105  
The Iranian Islamic revolution of 1979 offered the sharp political alternative 
to the prevailing politic models of the region.106 In Egpyt, Gamel Abdel Nasser and 
his successor, Anwar Sadat, had attempted to unify the Arab world under the banner 
of Arab Socialism. This nationalism developed over time to chart an independent 
course for the Arab regimes, tied neither to the West nor to the Soviet East, but 
rather to develop along uniquely Arab-lines of political thought. Writing in the 
Washington Quarterly, Graham Fuller recounts Israel’s defeat of the principal 
revolutionary Arab states—Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Iraq—in the 1967 Six-Day War 
was a turning point at which it became apparent that Arab nationalism had failed to 
deliver on its promises of unity, prosperity, and strength against the West.”107  
                                                        
105 Sick, Gary. “Iran’s Quest for Superpower Status.” Foreign Affairs, (1987): 699.   
106 6. Islam and Revolution – Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini, translated and 
annotated by Hamid Algar (Berkeley, CA: Mizan Press, 1981). 
107 Graham E. Fuller. "The Hizballah-Iran Connection: Model for Sunni Resistance." The 
Washington Quarterly 30, no. 1 (2006): 141.  
 67 
Fuller notes this political failure would have long-term implications on the Middle 
East as it would soon give rise to a more radical form of resistance in political Islam.  
Rami Siklawi writes the 1979 revolution would be greeted as a success 
against the perceived injustice and corruption of the old statist regimes. Similar to 
the Nasser-backed  
Governments, “The Shah of Iran had been renowned for his corruption and his ties 
with the West and Israel. The Iranian Revolution was also viewed as a major success 
for the Shiites of the Arab world, including Lebanon.”108Abbas William Samii notes 
even prior to a deeper involvement with Lebanese Hezbollah, the newly ratified 
Iranian constitution mandated the revolutionary regime’s involvement with the 
Lebanese Shi‘a. Article 3 asserts that the government is duty-bound to provide 
“unsparing support to the dispossessed of the world,” and Article 154 says that the 
government “supports the just struggles of the oppressed against the oppressors in 
every corner of the globe.”109  
The Congressional Research Service report notes, “Lebanese Hezbollah is 
Iran’s chief protégé movement in the region; their relationship began when 
Lebanese Shiite clerics of the pro-Iranian Lebanese Da’wa Party began to organize in 
1982 into what later was unveiled in 1985 as Hezbollah. Iran’s political, financial, 
and military aid to Hezbollah has helped it become a major force in Lebanon’s 
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politics.”110 Writing for the Middle East Institute, Ray Takeyh further notes Iran’s 
conduct in the Iran – Iraq War and involvement in the Lebanese civil war reflected 
its revolutionary nature. “Iran’s conduct in the war reflected its militancy and 
revolutionary fervor. This was not an interstate conflict fought for territorial 
adjustment or limited political objectives. At stake was a contest of ideologies and a 
competition for power.”111   
Takeyh believes in the immediate aftermath of the successful revolution, 
Iran’s clerical elite had a belief their religious piety and valor would again allow 
them to defeat a technologically superior ally in Iraq as well as challenge the other 
traditional powers of the Middle East. This would result in Iran viewing its struggle 
against its Arab neighbors as part of a larger religious war waged against the Great 
Satan (the United States). “Military planning and issues of strategy and tactics were 
cast aside for the sake of martyrdom and sacrifice. The war and revolution had 
somehow fused in the clerical imagination.” 112 Yet others, such as, Barbara Ann 
Rieffer-Flanagan, believe realism has always been at the heart of Iranian decision-
making. While Iranian elites would often cloth policies under the guise of radical 
Shia-Islamism, another level of analysis would reveal Tehran’s calculated decision 
making calculus’s in its antagonism with regional peer-competitors.113  
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Aside from its support to Hezbollah, Iranian behavior in the international 
system, Takyeh believes it is essential to recognize the Islamic Revolution of 1979 as 
a watershed moment. Unlike other political revolutions however, he believes 
Iranian external behavior was an outgrowth of its domestic experiences as young 
revolutionary guards sought to challenge the existing power structure of the region 
and unite disparate Shia factions under a more unified structure.114 Still other 
commentators take a more nuanced view when ascribing Shia Islam and the 
revolutionary nature of the regime as prime drivers for Iran’s action. Throughout 
the Cold War, the Middle East was often a proxy battleground between the United 
States and the Soviet Union.  
While Iran was aligned with the United States under the Shah, the revolution 
removed one of the West’s most consistent allies and dramatically altered the 
regional balance of power. Author’s Imad Salamey and Zanoubia Othman believe the 
while the role of ideology has had an effect of Iranian foreign policy it is also 
important to recognize “that Islamic Iran emerged amidst a deepening Cold War 
between its most detested foe, the US, and its next-door communist neighbor, the 
Soviet Union. Born out of Khomeini’s vision of an Islamic state, Iran had to assert its 
position in world politics. Inspired by neither the East nor the West, the Islamic 
Republic evolved as an “anti-imperialist Muslim version of the French Republic”.115 
Salamey and Othman believe Iranian behavior has gone through three periods 
characterized by a growing sense of realpolitik and acceptance of the country’s 
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political realities vis a vis its neighbors. These periods have been marked by a 
growing acceptance among the Iranian elite the country faced near strategic 
isolation, apart from an alliance with Syria, necessitating a more moderated tone to 
its pan-Islamic ideology.  
Confronted with a large scale Iraqi invasion in 1980 and continued American 
largesse to Saudi Arabia and Israel, Iran also had to accept the reality of its geo-
political isolation and seek to balance its adversaries. In the 1980’s, Iranian support 
to Hezbollah and involvement in the Lebanese Civil War allowed the nascent regime 
to burnish its Islamic revolutionary credentials as a means of enhancing its security. 
This proxy force would not only challenge Israeli influence in the country but also 
seek to develop a popular Shia political movement in-line with Iranian interests in 
the region. 
 
STRUCTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 
 Examination of Iranian behavior in the international system often begins 
with an emphasis on the Islamic revolutionary nature of the regime. This discussion 
often revolves around a discussion of the Iran’s attempts to spread its version of an 
Islamic revolution across the Middle East as a direct challenge to the more 
traditional Arab monarchies of Qatar and Saudi Arabia as well as the secular 
governments of Iraq and Egypt. While Iranian behavior is no doubt influenced by a 
distinct political ideology, its actions are often not analyzed assuming the state is a 
rational actor. Iran faces a unique geostrategic reality as Arab peer-competitors and 
a high-degree of American involvement in the strategically crucial Persian Gulf 
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region confront the state. In light of these challenges, Iranian actions, specifically its 
support to various proxy forces is often mischaracterized and misunderstood. Its 
Shia religious orientation and ethnically heterogeneous population separate it from 
many of its regional neighbors and in many cases isolate the regime thereby limiting 
its political options.116  
In the immediate years following the revolution, Iranian radicals sought to 
challenge the perceived adversaries of the Islamic revolution wherever possible. 
Similar to other revolutionary regimes, Said Amir Arjomand notes, “The first major 
foreign policy in revolutionary Iran was the typical one for all revolutions: the 
choice between the export of the revolution beyond Iran – and accommodation with 
the rest of the world.”117 At first blush Iranian support to Hezbollah seems as a 
natural outgrowth of its revolutionary character. However, a discussion of the 
nature of the international system and the competing viewpoints (offensive realism 
vs. defensive realism) may also provide a better understanding of Iranian covert 
support to its Lebanese proxy.  
In his seminal work, Theory of International Politics, Kenneth Waltz contends 
that states balance against power. 118 Waltz views structure as a set of constraining 
conditions imposed upon the units of the system. Additionally, Waltz notes, “in 
international politics, overwhelming power repels and leads others to try and 
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balance against it.”119 In a balance of power, weaker states recognize this imbalance 
and will undertake actions which seek to correct the imbalance. Waltz believes this 
situation leads the weaker state faced with a security dilemma under which they 
will seek to strengthen their positions relative to the stronger state(s).120  
Similar to Waltz, Stephen Walt argues that states balance against threat and 
states they rarely bandwagon with other peer competitors to avoid a potential 
conflict, seeing self-help as a better means of ensuring security.121 Walt’s analysis 
also notes the importance of domestic driver’s of foreign policy. Unlike offensive 
realists who assume conflict is the most likely outcome of a strategic competition, 
defensive realists such as Walt believe that the anarchic structure of world politics 
places all states under certain constraints.122 Brian Rathbun further notes, “States 
are forced to fend for themselves in a world in which no one can be counted on to 
protect them. Assuming states want to survive, the system therefore provides 
certain incentives to states.”123  
 In order to better understand the core differences amongst neo-realists, 
Jeffrey Taliaferro divides the arguments into two camps while noting, “Realist 
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theories share certain core assumptions.”124 Taliaferro notes these assumptions are 
that the international system is anarchic and there are incentives and opportunities 
to strengthen a state’s security. Both offense and defensive realists agree, “States 
under anarchy face the ever-present threat that other states will use force to harm 
or conquer them. This compels states to improve their relative power positions 
through arms buildups, unilateral diplomacy, mercantile (or even autarkic) foreign 
economic policies, and opportunistic expansion.”125 While Taliaferro does not 
conclude either defensive or offensive realism provide better explanations for a 
state’s behavior he does believe defensive realism allows more theoretical room to 
also examine the role domestic politics plays on international behavior.  
Davide Fiammenghi attempts to analyze the nature of the international 
system, also from a structural viewpoint, asking whether the system itself can 
explain, in part, a particular state’s behavior and interaction with friends and foes 
alike. Fiammenghi attempts to synthesize the two competing camps of neo-realism 
by noting both, “both offensive and defensive realists consider structural incentives 
as constant.”126 Yet Fiammenghi believes these competing views, loosely associated 
with Waltz and Walt, result in an oversimplification. The core of this 
oversimplification is the theory, “states always attempt to maximize their power, or 
they always try to maintain their power position.”127 This fails to account for 
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instances in which states fail to take offensive action when it is in their interest or 
when an opportunity presents itself. Ultimately, Fiammenghi believes “structural 
incentives change as a state moves along the power continuum,” in which certain 
situations create beneficial circumstances for either band-wagoning or balancing.128  
Cameron Thies further defines Waltz’s approach noting, “structure acts as a 
selector by rewarding some behaviors and punishing others. In this manner 
structure limits the kind and quality of outcomes produced by agents in the system 
despite the varying goals and efforts of those agents; however, structure does not 
directly produce effects in the system.”129 Thies’ approach expounds upon Waltz’s 
observations of the international system but does not discount the role domestic 
character in shaping a state’s behavior. Moving beyond a myopic focus on simply the 
structure of the system, Thies notes, “ structure affects behavior indirectly through 
two means: competition and socialization.” Thies’ approach recognizes the structure 
of the system, anarchy still pervades, but also believes state’s assume certain roles 
commensurate with their material capabilities. He identifies the great powers as the 
“dominant socializers in the international system,” who seek to maintain order and 
ensure their interests are met by the existing status quo. However, Theis believes 
states can assume roles within this system when the status quo does not allow for 
their socialization.130 
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Iran’s position with respect to its neighbors in the 1980s offers a unique 
case-study in which to assess its behavior. The revolutionary regime found itself 
without allies in a region where the United States and Soviet Union had long sought 
to extend their influence. The chaotic Lebanese Civil War seems to have provided a 
circumstance in which the revolutionary Islamic government could challenge the 
existing status-quo of the region while also spreading its form of Shia Islamic 
influence.   
 Existing literature discussing Iran’s support to Lebanese Hezbollah too often 
focuses on the role of ideology when assessing Iran’s actions in the Middle East and 
abroad. While we cannot fully dismiss the character of the regime as a driver for its 
actions, Iranian behavior has far too often not been fully analyzed through a 
consideration of Iranian national interest and a long-sought desire for Persian 
preeminence in the Middle East.131A wider analysis of Iranian behavior during the 
1980s should also be assessed in the context of its geopolitical position. Iran 
proclaimed itself neither part of the West or the East but as something distinct from 
the bi-polar axis of the Cold War. A neo-realist assessment of Iranian behavior with 
a focus on the structural constraints and incentives may allow for deeper 
assessment of Iran’s support to Hezbollah amongst other militant groups. 
Analysis 
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131 Ali, Lubna Abid. "Historic US - Iran Relations: Revisiting Ideology and Geostrategy." Pakistan 
Journal Of American Studies 26, no. 1/2 (April 2008): 55.; 
Menashri, David. "Iran’s Regional Policy: Between Radicalism and Pragmatism." Journal Of 
International Affairs 60, no. 2 (Summer2007 2007): 155.  
 76 
 Realist theory, both offensive and defensive, makes several important 
assumptions that should first be outlined before applying the different tests they 
ascribe to understanding a state’s actions. Both defensive and offensive realists 
posit states often tend to view the international system through a lens, which 
assumes the worst-case scenario. As previously stated, states must operate under 
the assumption the international system, lacking an overarching power to govern 
individual state’s actions, is largely a self-help world.132 Within this anarchic 
environment, a state must assume a “zero-sum” environment exists between states 
in which one’s gain relative to the other serves as a disadvantage to the weaker 
state.133  
 Writing in International Organization Stephen Brooks further identifies the 
following as core assumptions shared between both offensive and defensive 
theorists: “both have a systemic focus; both are state centric; both view 
international politics as inherently competitive; both emphasize material factors, 
rather than non-material factors; and both assume states are egoistic actors that 
pursue self-help.”134 Additionally, while neo-realist theories have often been 
criticized for a lack of appreciation on the role domestic politics can serve to 
influence a state’s policies, both offensive and defensive proponents would again 
point to the system of international politics, which provides incentives and 
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constraints on a state’s range of decision. “When states do not respond ideally to 
their structural situations, neorealism tells us we should find evidence of domestic 
politics and ideas distorting the decision-making process.”135  
Both theories allow the nature of state’s internal decision making process or 
structure to influence its range of action, but more precisely, neo-realist theory 
would point to instances in which a state was not fully appreciate of which options it 
possessed at a given time. In this instance both would point to structural limitations 
imposed on a state, which regardless of its ideology or form of government either 
constrained or provide options to exercise power or provide greater security.  
 Additionally, neo-realists make similar assumptions in identifying the state 
as the sole entity by which to safeguard or advance specific national interests. While 
interests groups and individuals may have an influence on certain elements of a 
state’s behavior, the nation-state is the ultimate arbiter of international affairs. “A 
state should act as a unitary actor protecting a country’s national interest, 
understood as more than just the aggregation of the preferences of individuals and 
groups in society.”136  
 Finally, realists assume individual states determine their respective actions 
based upon a rational assessment of one’s geo-strategic environment. Simply put, a 
weak state which faces a relative disadvantage to a stronger neighboring state 
would be foolish to engage in bellicose behavior unilaterally as the stronger state’s 
power would largely constrain the weaker state’s options. This rational assessment 
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of a state’s environment and the systemic constraints, which exist in international 
affairs often, serves as a prime driver for understanding a state’s action. 137 
 Given these common core assumptions it is also necessary to identify key 
points of disagreement between offensive and defensive realist proponents. 
Offensive realists point to the inevitability of conflict between states. This reality 
serves as a prime driver for particular actions a state undertakes. Under this “worst 
case option” states recognize strength through the acquisition of power as the best 
deterrent to conflict or in the face of conflict, providing it with the maximum amount 
of advantage. Perhaps the most prominent contemporary offensive realist, John 
Mearshimer writes the international system is like, “brutal arena where states look 
for opportunities to take advantage of each other. International relations is not a 
constant state of war, but is a state of relentless security competition.”138 This 
possibility of a conflict amongst a state and a near competitor thereby forces the 
state to seek ways in which to advance its interests and influence in its region. 
Offensive realists would note security in the anarchic international system is often 
fleeting – if a state is to survive in this environment it must look for potential allies 
to counterbalance a threat or a weak state it can influence to ultimately enhance its 
sense of security against looming threats.139 
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 Unlike defensive realist theory, offensive proponents believe states will 
resort to aggressive action when they recognize it will enhance its own national 
security. As opposed to the status-quo theory, offensive realism assumes states will 
always attempt to maximize their power as the surest means of survival. In an 
uncertain environment in which the true intentions of competing states can never 
be fully understood, a state will attempt to become a hegemon thereby asserting 
dominance over peer competitors.140 Mearshimer believes this is the underlying 
tragedy of great powers as conflict is almost inevitable when states attempt to seek 
gains at the expense of others, “"great powers recognize that the best way to ensure 
their security is to achieve hegemony now, thus eliminating any possibility of a 
challenge by another great power. Only a misguided state would pass up an 
opportunity to be the hegemon in the system because it thought it already had 
sufficient power to survive.”141  
In contrast to the pessimistic outlook offensive realism holds, defensive realists 
theorist tend to take a more nuanced approach to understanding why states 
undertake certain actions. Defensive theory holds while the international system is 
indeed anarchic, states make their decisions based upon an assessment of the 
probability of potential threats.142 Most importantly, defensive realists maintain the 
ultimate goal of any state in this environment is not power (as offensive realists 
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would maintain) but rather the acquisition of security.143 This change in priorities, 
between power and security, often results in states first ensuring they have 
acquired enough defensive capability, economic and military, before seeking to 
advance their interests in what could be perceived as bellicose by neighboring 
states.  Therefore, defensive theorists maintain: “state decision makers do not 
maximize power because of an insatiable desire to dominate others; rather states 
pursue power because doing so allows for maximum flexibility in achieving the 
nation's instrumental interests. In other words, postclassical realism holds that 
decision makers pursue power because it is the mechanism by which to achieve the 
state's overriding objectives.”144  
A defensive realist would likely hold the proposition that actions a state 
undertakes, while appearing bellicose to others, are in fact rational actions intended 
to guarantee its security. This also results in a balance of power in which these 
states seek to either increase influence to balance against a competitor or form 
alliances to check the relative power of a peer competitor.145 Additionally, defensive 
realist theory allows for the influence domestic political ideology can have in 
shaping a state’s threat perception. This may result in a more bellicose state which 
recognizes its security as linked to territorial acquisition while a less radical state 
may be willing to live with whatever status quo is present in its strategic 
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environment. Amongst defensive realists, domestic politics act as an influence on a 
state’s foreign policy choices, however the structure of the system and more 






APPLYING NEO-REALISM THEORY TO UNDERSTAND IRAN’S SUPPORT TO 
HEZBOLLAH 
 Iranian support to Lebanese Hezbollah then provides a unique study by 
which to apply both offensive and defensive realist theory. Widely regarded as a 
highly ideological and unpredictable actor in the international system, theocratic 
Iran has long been referred to as an international pariah and a constant spoiler to 
maintaining a stable balance of power in the Middle East. Beyond these 
pronouncements however, Iran’s actions may be better understand by applying the 
different tests of offensive and defensive realists theory identified above.147   
 While Iranian opposition to Israeli influence in the Middle East is 
undoubtedly connected to its vision of pan-Islamist ideology, Tel-Aviv and Tehran 
have long fought for influence in similar venues throughout the region. The Israeli 
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invasion of Southern Lebanon on 1982 was originally directed against Palestinian 
Liberation Organization (PLO) enclaves in the Bekaa Valley and Eastern Beirut. 
While the Israeli Army would dislodge Arafat’s safe-havens in the country and force 
their withdrawal to Tunisia, Iran recognized an opportunity to expand its influence 
to the dispossessed Shia population of Lebanon, which had long suffered economic 
and political disenfranchisement.148 This action would have the dual benefit of 
appealing to a larger Shia audience within the region as well as to challenge the 
traditional regional hegemon of Israel.149 Following the consolidation of power 
within Iran, Khomeini maintained his revolutionary exhortations of world 
revolution but this rhetoric would be supplanted with a far more pragmatic 
application of Iranian actions in the region.150 It is therefore likely Iran and Israel 
both sought to expand their influence as a means of maximizing their power and/or 
security so as to maximize their strategic advantage. Lebanon, with its highly 
sectarian and factionalized government, offered both states a means of expanding 
their power respective to other peer competitors. Iran’s early recognition of the 
long-marginalized Shiite population should be seen not only as a means by which 
Tehran could burnish its revolutionary credentials but also a venue to project its 
power and balance against its Arab Socialist and monarchist competitors.  
 As Israel presented a challenge to both the Arab monarchies and Arab 
socialist regimes (Egypt, Syria and Iraq) an Islamic Iran with larger desires in the 
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Middle East believed support to the Shia fundamentalist Hezbollah would allow the 
regime to claim a large moral victory as well as frustrate Israeli strategic designs. 
Prior to the 1979 revolution, Iran was on of the few states to recognize the 
legitimacy of Israel and in the case of the Shah, Tel Aviv enjoyed robust diplomatic 
relations and a limited intelligence sharing relationship to counter Arab influence. 
While Israel was initially skeptical of the Islamic revolution and its implications on 
future regional power dynamics, the Tel Aviv continued to believe Tehran would 
remain a reliable partner against Iraqi and Saudi power.151 
 In recognition of its place in a dangerous geo-strategic environment, Iran’s 
support to Hezbollah was likely a piece of Tehran’s broader strategy to project 
power outside of its borders and change or at least challenge the existing status-quo 
of the Middle East. Iran prior to the 1979 revolution was similarly viewed with 
suspicion by its regional competitors. Author Raymond Hinnebush writes, “ The 
Shah made Iran a regional power in material terms through oil-fuelled 
modernization, arms acquisitions, and positioning his regime under the Nixon 
Doctrine as a bulwark against Soviet power and Arab radicalism.”152 Under the new 
theocratic government, Iran’s leaders recognized their isolation as a dangerous 
strategic impediment. Coupled with the revolutionary fervor and potential appeal of 
pan-Islamic ideology, Khomeini recognized the Lebanese Civil War as an 
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opportunity to challenge the region’s status quo and become a player in the Arab-
Israeli conflict.  
While a wide-range of commentators often ascribe Islamic ideology as a 
prime driver for Iranian actions, a structural assessment of the international system 
with which Iran confronted following the 1979 Revolution provides important 
insights to better understanding the rationale behind its behavior. Support to the 
destitute Shia of southern Lebanon would allow Tehran to burnish its pan-Islamic 
credentials to domestic and international audiences but more importantly, it 
provided the regime a means to advance its interests in the region while challenging 
both the United States and Israel. This constituted part of a wider strategy to 
position itself as a challenger to the traditional balance of power in the Middle East 
and insert a new form of Islamic justice into world politics. 153 Here, offensive realist 
theory tends to better explain Tehran’s actions in the wider Middle East as defensive 
theorists would maintain states are largely satisfied with the status quo and 
conservative in nature. While Iran sought a greater sense of security, the 
revolutionary government also recognized Hezbollah as a valuable proxy by which 
to mobilize the Shiite minority; were this intervention to be successful it may 
provide a future roadmap for increased Iranian influence in other Arab states.  
 As offensive theory would postulate, Iran’s revolutionary government sought 
not only to challenge the traditional power centers of the Middle East but also to 
apply its unique brand of Islamic theology to challenge the existing status-quo. As 
David Menshari notes, The Islamic Revolution led to a dramatic change in Iran's 
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foreign outlook and its international relations. For the new leaders of Iran, the 
Islamic Revolution was not just a title for a movement, but an ideal they wished to 
put into practice throughout the Muslim world. The Islamic regime viewed its 
victory as one stage in and an instrument of an overall change in the world of 
Islam—a model for imitation by other Muslims.”154 Within the context of the still 
simmering Cold War and Iraq’s unsuccessful invasion of the country in 1980, Iranian 
decision makers recognized a unique opportunity to export their brand of religious 
governance into the complexities of the Lebanese Civil War.  
 Iran’s position with respect to its rivals and peer competitors in the 1980s 
found the Islamic Republic without allies in the region and a near international 
pariah state. Saddam’s invasion of Iran in 1980 was largely supported by the Arab 
Gulf monarchies that believed the fractured Iranian revolutionary government 
would collapse in the face of a large conventional-force invasion.155 Despite early 
tactical gains in the oil-rich province of Khuzestan, Iraqi commanders failed to 
exploit the initial Iranian surprise and soon found themselves on the defensive. 
Recognizing the potential challenge Iran posed to the status quo of the Middle East, 
Arab monarchies supported the Iraqi invasion not out of ideology but rather a 
common fear of revolutionary Iranian actions especially amongst their own Shia 
populations. Trita Parsi observes, “The Iraq-Iran war reinforced the notion that Iran 
could not afford to allow its security to be dependent on any other state, and as a 
result, befriending Iran’s immediate neighbor was a more optimal policy than 
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weakening them through alliances with remote states.”156 Iranian leaders 
recognized this struggle had more to do with traditional competition over influence 
in the region and accordingly they needed to seek an external balancer to offset the 
predominance of Arab influence as well as to challenge Israeli military dominance.  
 Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini stated shortly after 
the Shah was removed from power, “Iran was only "the starting point." Muslims "are 
one family," he added, "even if they live in regions remote from each other." 157 As 
Salamey and Othman describe, throughout history, Shia communities, in various 
degrees, have presented a serious challenge to the different empires that dominated 
the Islamic world. As a result, most Sunni monarchs have viewed the Shia with 
suspicion, brutally repressing their revolts with an iron fist.”158  Even during the 
time of the Shah, Arab states remained suspicious of Iranian intentions in the wider 
region and feared America tilting its support in favor of Iran vice maintaining the 
delicate balance of power in the region. The addition of Islamic/Shia universalism to 
Iranian behavior likely further underscored Arab fears of Iranian intentions. 
Khomeini’s early attempts at sparking a unifying pan-Islamic movement did little to 
mobilize the Arab world however who still viewed his rhetoric through the context 
of the wider Shia – Sunni religious split. Arab states still viewed Iranian behavior 
through a nationalist lens based on competing political, and economic interests.  
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 Similar to Reza Shah Pahlavi’s claims of Iranian supremacy in the Persian 
Gulf, the revolutionary government claimed to be dominant power in the Middle 
East with former President Hajatollah Rafsanji declaring in 1985 Iran’s naval and 
other forces as the guardians of Persian Gulf security.159 Ray Takyeh believes the 
Iraqi invasion of the nascent government unwittingly handed the hard-line clerical 
elements a significant political victory as they were able to silence more secular 
elements within the still forming government. As the Iran – Iraq War continued 
throughout the 1980s Iranian leaders were able to conveniently fuse the rhetoric of 
radical Shia Islamism while still appealing to a more traditional sense of Persian 
nationalism. Takyeh states, “In its quest to defend the war, the clerical state did not 
neglect Persian national- ism, but rather fused it with the larger Islamic task. As a 
vanguard revolutionary state, Iran was the first nation to inaugurate an Islamic 
Republic and dedicate itself to the awakening of mankind.”160 The 1982 Israeli 
invasion of Lebanon equally provided Iran a unique opportunity to increase its 
influence in the region as a means of challenging the conservative Gulf monarchies 
as well as the Israeli regime whose very legitimacy Khomeini would refuse to 
recognize.  
 By the early 1980s with a stalemated war against Iraq only increasing in 
terms of human and economic costs Tehran was unable to diplomatically engage its 
Gulf neighbors who still feared Persian dominance more than Saddam’s Arab 
Socialism. Tehran was unable to separate the disparate Gulf states in their support 
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for Saddam as, the longer the Gulf states supported Saddam, the more difficult it was 
for the clerics to maintain a policy of reconciliation. This structural impediment 
likely drove Iran to reevaluate its relative position in the region and recognize the 
need to maximize its power, amidst a self-help world, and identify possible venues 
by which to increase its influence and change the existing balance of power. In the 
end, Iran’s determination to prosecute the war, its frequent denunciation of these 
states’ legitimacy, and its support for local opposition groups obscured its hesitant 
and modest efforts to reach out. The fact that the Gulf states remained a steady 
source of support for Saddam had much to do with Iran’s self-defeating and 
contradictory practices.”161  
 Soviet Russia’s grudging acceptance of “Socialism in One Country,” serves as 
a parallel to Iranian decision makers recognition on the limits of their revolutionary 
appeal provided the dispossessed of the Islamic world.162  While Khomeini 
genuinely believed in spreading the revolution amongst the Arab states he also 
recognized the limits or Iranian national power. David Menshari notes, “Although 
national considerations were alien to Khomeini’s stated desire to expand Islamic 
influence throughout the Middle East, his regime chose to conduct its policy 
primarily from a perception of Iran’s state interests.”163   
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 While both offensive and defensive realist theories focus on the structure of 
the international system proponents chiefly disagree about the prime drivers for a 
states action. Simply put, this debate revolves around the question of security or 
power. Analyzing Iranian behavior and its support to the nascent Hezbollah 
movement in the 1980s, offensive theory seems to provide a more consistent 
rational for Tehran’s behavior.164 The status-quo in the region was clearly unaligned 
with Iranian interests as its national decision makers faced a massive Iraqi invasion 
as well as being ostracized by the region’s power brokers, to include the United 
States. 165These structural limitations therefore likely served as a key driver for 
Tehran’s decision to covertly support Lebanese Hezbollah. The insurgent movement 
not only allowed Iran to burnish it’s pan-Islamic credentials but more appropriately 
as a means to expand Iran’s power in the region. This action also allowed Tehran an 
opportunity to balance against its perceived threats from neighboring Arab states. 
The development of a strong-Shiite proxy force would allow the Iranian regime a 
means by which to enhance its regional standing and compensate for its strategic 
isolation. 
 Additionally, Tehran’s decision makers exercised a remarkably similar view 
of Iran’s view in the wider Middle East – contending the country was a natural 
regional great power which should be able to exercise its influence. While the Iran-
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Iraq War stymied Tehran’s efforts to export their revolution to neighboring Arab 
states, Lebanon and the dispossessed Shiite minority provide Iran with a valuable 
venue to increase its power vis a vis its competitors. Consistent with Imperial 
Iranian designs to spread Tehran’s influence, theocratic Iran also sought to expand 
influence across the region. Despite a revolutionary government, Iranian actions 
during this period bear a striking resemblance to previous designs on the Middle 
East exercised by the Shah. While revolutionary rhetoric consolidated domestic 
political control, Iran’s ever-pragmatic Ayatollah’s likely recognized the need to 
expand Tehran’s influence as a means of guaranteeing the regime’s survival and 
expanding its power.  
Iran’s involvement in the civil war and its support to Hezbollah was nothing 
new to the country which had seen successive external powers assert influence into 
the country’s political scene. Iranian involvement could similarly be understood to 
be part of a larger recognition of Lebanon as an age-old proxy battlefield in which 
French, Israeli and Syrian governments sought to extend their respective power.  
The competing Shi’ite movements of Amal and Hezbollah were never understood to 
be complete extensions of Tehran’s foreign policy but rather convenient allies based 
upon common Shia political linkages. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps training 
and support to Hezbollah was rather a calculated recognition of Iran’s desire for 
primacy in the region in the face of numerous external adversaries. This proxy 
would allow Tehran a mechanism by which to enhance its national power in an 
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Iran War Proxy  
 
Research Question: What factors best explain the United States’ involvement 




Following the tumultuous events of the Iranian Revolution in which a 
stalwart American ally in Middle East was dramatically replaced by a hostile 
theocratic government. Iraq under Saddam Hussein would soon seek to exploit the 
revolutionary unrest by launching a preemptive invasion into the southern region of 
Iran. In the waning years of the Carter Administration, amidst the Iranian 
Revolution and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the United States assumed a more 
direct role in the Persian Gulf stating it would use all means necessary to include 
force to maintain access to the region’s oil resources.  
American national security officials had long feared the possibility of a single 
power, Arab or Persian, assuming a dominant role in the Middle East as well as the 
possibility of Soviet interference. Saddam Hussein’s largely secular form of Arab 
Socialism sought to emulate Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s efforts to 
unite the disparate Arab states into a unified union also posed a direct threat to the 
monarchical regimes of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain.166167 Additionally, the 
United States viewed the Islamic Republic – having overthrown a key US security 
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component - as a serious threat to its previous hegemony of the Persian Gulf region. 
Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Iran in 1980 was largely greeted with overt support 
from his Arab neighbors who feared Iran’s desire to spread Shia theocracy across 
the Middle East.168 Over the course of the 8-year conflict the United States would 
shift its support, both overt and covert, between Tehran and Baghdad as it sought to 
apply a policy of offshore balancing to maintain a tenuous balance of power in the 
strategically important region.169  
This paper will examine the US’ considerations in the region during the 
1980s and seek to understand which factors influenced US actions and how 
seemingly contradictory support for both Iraq and Iran can be best understood. 
During the course of the eight year-long Iran Iraq War, the United States would shift 
its support at different times for both Iran and Iraq amidst the 8 conflict. Despite the 
fact Revolutionary Iran posed a number of threats for the more traditional power 
centers of Riyadh and Baghdad as most Arab leaders viewing the theocratic 
government as a threat to the regional status quo, the United States still viewed Iran 
as a strategic focal point to prevent possible Soviet diplomatic and military influence 
into the region.  Additionally, Washington would seek to reestablish official 
diplomatic relationships with Baghdad as well as providing key intelligence to Iraq 
amidst the conflict to prevent a possible Iranian victory. Through an examination of 
relevant literature this case study present a unique instances where a hegemonic 
state provided aid to both belligerents in a conflict.  
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Starting in 1968, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson declared his intention 
to withdraw military assets from east of the Suez.170  Into this power vacuum the 
United States asserted a role previously held by the British Empire as it sought to 
develop a dual strategy of arming the Iranian military and providing political 
support to the monarchy of Saudi Arabia. Author David Crist notes, “With Saudi oil 
money and its regional prestige as keeper of the Holy Cities of Mecca and Medina, 
coupled with Iran’s military muscle, these two nations would serve as America’s 
proxies to contain the Soviet Union.”171 American security and economic interests 
were best served through Washington’s sometimes-complicated bilateral 
relationship with both Tehran and Saudi Arabia. The United States functioned in 
much the same way as the British Empire had; providing support to the regional 
power centers while maintaining a calculated balance whereby neither Tehran or 
Riyadh would be able to assert dominance in the region.172 
Additionally, US strategic priorities in the aftermath of the Vietnam War 
began to shift towards the region as Britain’s retrenchment left the lingering fear of 
possible Soviet influence. Presidential Directive 62 stated, “While NATO will retain 
first call on force deployments in peacetime, for wartime operations, the Persian 
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Gulf shall have highest priority for improvement of strategic lift and general purpose 
forces in the five-year defense program.”173 As Roham Alvandi states, “Britain’s 
balance of power policy in the Gulf consisted of preventing either of the two largest 
littoral powers, Iran and Saudi Arabia, from dominating their smaller and weaker 
Arab neighbors, while also deterring any other great power from entering the 
Gulf.”174 
Since the energy crisis of the 1970s where a grouping of international oil 
producing states, largely based in the Middle East, began a concerted oil embargo in 
protest towards US support for Israel during the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the US 
strategic planners began re-assessing American military and diplomatic posture in 
the region.175  As President Jimmy Carter and his national security staffed re-
assessed vital American interests it became clear the United States was becoming 
more and more beholden to Middle Eastern oil as a result of declining domestic 
production.176  In response the United States began an important pivot towards the 
region as it dedicated military assets and political influence to safeguard the vital 
resource.177 Iraq’s invasion of revolutionary Iran presented the United States with 
numerous difficulties and limited options in a region identified as key to American 
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interests.  
The Islamic Revolution of 1979 and the ensuing Iran Iraq War posed a 
challenge to the delicate order, which had previously existed. Then President Jimmy 
Carter along with his national security staff responded to this rise in instability by 
fundamentally altering America’s role in the region with the announcement of a new 
US strategy, which would come to be known as the Carter Doctrine. In his 1980 State 
of the Union Address, Carter announced. "An attempt by any outside force to gain 
control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests 
of the United States. It will be repelled by the use of any means necessary, including 
military force."178 This change in policy reflected growing American unease at 
regional instability caused by ongoing territorial and political disputes between 
Baghdad and Tehran; even prior to the revolution, American backed Shah Pahlavi 
threatened to invade Iraq to satisfy Iran’s long-held claims over the important Shat-
al-Arab waterway linking Iraq to the Persian Gulf.179 
The eight-year Iran-Iraq War began in September of 1980 as Saddam 
Hussein’s forces crossed into Iranian territory with the stated aim of capturing oil 
rich and Arab ethnic minority inhabited Khuzestan. Hussein believed a quick strike 
into the valuable region would have the two-fold effect of limiting the spread of the 
Iranian revolution to Iraq’s Shiite majority as well as taking advantage of Khomeini’s 
still fractured government. Iraqi forces made initial gains and capturing several vital 
population centers, however, this initial success would be met by a quick reversal of 
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fortunes as the Iraqi Army quickly entered into a stalemate with the Iranian forces. 
Prior to the Iranian Revolution, the Shah’s military had been regarded as highly 
competent benefiting from American largesse as well as training and state of the art 
military hardware. However, the immediate years following the revolution 
devastated the Shah’s former military as revolutionary purges had led to a large-
scale exodus of well-educated professionals and military officers connected to the 
Pahlavi regime.180 
Hussein viewed himself as a replacement to Egyptian General Gamel Nasser; 
an Arab ruler who could forge a united political entity across the region and unite 
disparate peoples under the banner of Arab socialism. The Islamic regime presented 
Hussein with a political threat, which he believed had the potential to incite revolt 
across the Shiite majority population of Iraq. The 1980 September invasion of 
Iranian Khuzestan was intended to serve as a quick death knell to the still unformed 
government in Tehran. Perhaps to some degree, Hussein was correct; the once 
vaunted Iranian military was in disarray as many of its American trained officers 
feared reprisals from the revolutionary government.  
As the New Republic noted in a 1984 article, “Large-scale defections reduced 
the Iranian order of battle. The officer corps was decimated by purges and 
executions affecting 50 percent of the field-grade officers and all two hundred 
generals.”181 This had the effect of changing Arab perceptions in the region as the 
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once vaunted Iranian military was suddenly without a key component of its national 
military leadership. This perceived domestic instability likely gave Saddam Hussein 
and his revisionist view of Iraqi land claims the necessary pretext for which he had 
been waiting. Beginning on September 22 1980 Iraqi forces conducted a large-scale 
invasion of Iranian territory with the stated aims of re-asserting Iraqi claims to the 
Shat-al-Arab as well as occupying the oil rich and Arab majority Iranian province of 
Khuzestan.  
Iraq’s initial victories against the disorganized Iranian Army were soon 
halted and by late 1980 the war had reached a standstill. Following a reorganization 
of the Iranian military and mass mobilization of its youth, the Iranian Army began to 
slowly recapture lost gains of the previous year. By 1982 Iranian forces had erased 
the Iraqi gains and begun a widespread invasion of southern Iraq as Hussein 
attempted to negotiate a cease-fire.  The war would continue for another six bloody 
years, as the Iranian counterattack into southern Iraq would soon bog down into 
stalemated trench warfare reminiscent of World War One. The United States and 
other outside powers initially maintained a stance of official neutrality aware that 
an overwhelming Iraqi victory and seizure of Iran’s southern oilfields could 
potentially upend the regional balance of power. Soon however, this neutrality 
would become far more nuanced as the United States and the Soviet Union jockeyed 
for influence between the warring states as well as supplying massive amounts of 
military aid.  
                                                                                                                                                                     





The Iran Iraq War provides a unique case study in which to better 
understand a superpower’s involvement in a regional conflict through proxy. The 
United State’s complex involvement in the conflict would include the provision of 
covert military aid to the fledgling Iranian revolutionary government as well as 
sharing sensitive intelligence with Iraqi leaders as the nature of its involvement 
changed over time. The 1979 hostage crisis and subsequent Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan marked dramatic upheavals in the region, as a delicate status quo 
would be upended by Khomeini’s excoriations and Hussein’s invasion of Iran. The 
seemingly contradictory nature of America’s provision of covert aid to Iran, known 
as the Iran Contra affair, and its later political and military support to Iraq offer an 
example by which to assess a superpower’s involvement through proxy.   
In seeking to better understand American strategic rationale for its nuanced 
approach to the Iran - Iraq War a review of relevant literature In this paper I will 
seek to better assess strategic considerations which likely affected United State’s 
involvement in the Iran Iraq War. A review of relevant literature as important to 
understanding existing research assessing the strategic rationale for the United 
States’ behavior in the conflict as well as to identify competing theories.  In light of a 
predominance of analysis which focuses on the impact of the Iranian revolution 
rather than a systematic review of great power interest in maintaining a delicate 
balance of power further research should be conducted to better identify prime 
drivers for American action.  
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Literature Review  
 
A large body of existing literature on the United States’ role in thee 1980s Middle 
East tends to focus on the role the nature of the Islamic Iranian government played 
in effecting Washington’s decision making processes. To be sure, the 1979 Islamic 
Revolution sent shockwaves throughout the Middle East as Ayatollah Khomeini’s 
vision of velayat-e faqih directly challenged the Arab monarchies as well as the Arab 
Socialist states of Iraq, Syria and Egypt.182  Prior to the revolution, the United States 
viewed the Shah as a crucial piece of its defense strategy in the Middle East. 
Alongside Saudi Arabia, pre-revolutionary Iran was viewed as one part of a “dual-
pillar strategy” in which it would serve as a crucial buffer to any possible Soviet 
intervention in the region.183 The sudden erosion of a key piece of Washington’s 
strategy overturned decades of American military and political support and created 
a security vacuum in a strategic theater. At the outset of the war, both the United 
States and the Soviet Union declared official neutrality in the conflict as both sides 
warily assessed the implications of the still simmering Iranian Revolution. Despite 
this stated neutrality, as the war progressed both Washington and Moscow would 
calculate their aid to the combatants as a means of advancing their respective 
interests. 184 
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US SUPPORT TO IRAQ DRIVEN BY A DESIRE TO CONTAIN THE IRANIAN 
REVOLUTION  
 
Ray Takeyh believes the war between Iran and Iraq presented the United States 
with a number of unpleasant options but American involvement, especially in 
provision of aid and intelligence to Iraq, was borne out largely as a result of a 
spreading Islamist political order. While the United States fully recognized the 
inherent nature of the Iraqi regime, it calculated it could not tolerate an additional 
“radical clerical regime” in a major oil producing nation. Takeyh notes the ideal 
outcome for Tehran would be to extend its template of Shiite revolutionary 
government to Iraq and overthrow Saddam Hussein’s apostate regime.185 Citing the 
writings of Ayatollah Khomeini in which he stated, “We [Iran] should try to export 
our revolution to the world. We should set aside the thought that we do not export 
our revolution, because Islam does not regard various Islamic countries differently 
and is the support of all the oppressed peoples of the world."186 
Additionally, Zach Fredman believes American fears of Iranian actions were 
based primarily on Tehran winning the war and spreading the war to a prominent 
Arab regime in the region. These fears were illustrated by the US State Department’s 
removal of Iraq as a state-sponsor of terrorism as Washington began a slow but 
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steady re-orientation towards Baghdad.187 As Fredman states “The bottom line, 
according to analysts, was that Iranians wanted to overthrow Saddam, and Saddam 
would be more likely to improve American–Iraqi ties than any potential successor 
regime.”188 In conjunction with an increase in Saudi and Kuwaiti oil exports, 
Fredman believes the United States recognized it could do without Iranian oil and 
sufficiently tilt towards Baghdad without economic repercussions. American 
calculations, in this instance, were based on Washington’s fear of the Islamic 
Revolution spreading to key allies in the region and the threats this new type of 
governance would pose to the wider region.189  
While Baghdad was far from a consistent US ally, American officials were well 
aware of the takeover of the US embassy in Tehran and the tense standoff to free the 
hostages as well as the suspected Iranian hand backing the Shiite fundamentalist 
group Hezbollah in Lebanon. This fear was grounded in an appreciation of Tehran’s 
revolutionary designs for the wider-region as well as the possibility of fomenting 
discord amongst Saudi and Bahraini Shiite minorities. Daniel Pipes noted in a 1987 
article “At stake is the possible resurgence of anti-American fundamentalist Islam, 
the security of Western access to Persian Gulf oil, and potential Soviet 
predominance in the region. Abdication is not a responsible choice.”190  This view 
reflects a Washington foreign policy consensus that was largely focused on the role 
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of the Islamic Revolution and possible effects of a possible Iranian victory. Support 
to Baghdad through intelligence sharing and material support would have the effect 
of blunting the Shiite revolutionary fervor as well as putting Tehran on notice with 
respect to American resolve towards the region.  
Writing in the National Review columnist Brian Crozier states the United States 
and the Soviet Union failed to fully appreciate the revolutionary nature of Shiite-
fundamentalism. This new form of government, which blended Shiite theocracy 
with revolutionary fervor, posed a unique challenge to Western interests in the 
region. Only by backing the regime of Saddam Hussein would the United States be 
able to counter the Iranian regime, which held the potential of unseating long-
established regimes throughout the wider region. Moreover, Crozier believes in 
these circumstances, the United States and Soviet Union shared a rare-confluence of 
interests in which neither government benefited from a renewed Shiite 
fundamentalist movement which could potentially transcend national boundaries 
and political allies.191  
Since the tumultuous events surrounding the Iranian Revolution and the 
dramatic seizure of American diplomatic personnel, both countries have seemingly 
been entrenched in a zero-sum game of competition. Writing in Diplomacy and 
Statecraft, Bernd Kaussler and Anthony Newkirk believe American foreign policy 
towards Iran has been one of consistent containment towards the Islamic regime. 
Fearing the possibly transcendent nature of the Islamic revolution and the 
possibility Tehran could stir-up trouble amongst the region’s disposed Shiite 
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minorities, Washington began a campaign of containing the nascent Khomeini 
government combining economic, diplomatic and military actions.192  
Yet this does not adequately explain why the United States would carefully 
calculate its provision of lethal aid and intelligence to Iraq if it did indeed view Iran 
as the primary regional threat. American covert provision of aid to the Iranian 
regime occurred in the shadows as leverage to release the American hostages held 
in Beirut during the early 1980s. Washington likely recognized Tehran’s influence 
over the disparate Shiite groups in Lebanon and viewed the covert deliver of arms 
to Iran as a valuable tool to affect the hostage’s release. As Crist notes, in 1985 the 
United States began approaching Iranian officials through clandestine 
intermediaries the possibility America could provide key weaponry to the regime as 
an act of good faith as well as a demonstration of Washington’s possible support 
contingent upon Tehran’s moderation of its actions.193 Crist believes American 
officials were more concerned with currying good favor with the regime to ensure a 
bulwark against possible Soviet interference in Iranian domestic affairs.  
Additionally, a key component of the Iranian revolutionary movement often 
overlooked was the influential communist Tudeh party which had long enjoyed 
direct support from Moscow.194  Writing in The Rise and Fall of the Tudeh Party, 
Farhang Jahanpour notes “Since the 1979 revolution, Tudeh members have been 
among the staun- chest supporters of the Islamic regime. In fact, the Tudeh Party 
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was the last non-clerical group which continued to support Ayatollah Khomeini's 
'popular and anti-imperialist line' ; and it was, in turn, tolerated by Khomeini until it 
was no longer regarded as useful and joined those many other sup- porters of the 
Islamic regime who were eventually destroyed by it.”195 Khomeini and American 
officials nervous about a post Shah-Iran viewed this political movement as a 
possible vanguard to a pro-Soviet Iranian state. Khomeini’s internal consolidation of 
political power in the immediate years of the revolution was largely focused on 
blunting any possible challengers to the Islamic theocracy from the left.  
 In assessing Iranian foreign policy and the United State’s response to the 
changed post-revolutionary environment Imad Salame and Zanoubia Othman 
observe, “It is important to note that Islamic Iran emerged amidst a deepening Cold 
War between its most detested foe, the US, and its next-door communist neighbor, 
the Soviet Union. Born out of Khomeini’s vision of an Islamic state, Iran had to assert 
its position in world politics.”196 Salame and Othman believe the Iranian regime and 
its concept of revolutionary Islamic theocracy posed a unique challenge to the 
neighboring Arab states as well as to the United States.  
The Iraq invasion of Iran in 1980 provided Tehran with a unique opportunity 
in which it could export its revolution to neighboring Iraq and its Shia majority 
population. In a sense, Hussein’s invasion of Iran would allow Khomeini to 
counterattack against the apostate regime by an appeal to it’s underserved Shiite 
class, “It was therefore only natural for the Iranian Revolution, if it was to be 
                                                        
195 Farhang Jahanpour. “Iran: The Rise and Fall of the Tudeh Party.” The World Today , Vol. 40, 
No. 4 (April 1984): 154.   
196 Salamey, Imad, and Zanoubia Othman. "Shia Revival and Welayat Al-Faqih in the Making of 
Iranian Foreign Policy." Politics, Religion & Ideology 12, no. 2 (June 2011): 202.  
 106 
expanded or exported, to find in Iraq a host group to support its ideological zeal.”197 
Salame and Othman conclude the uniqueness and danger posed by revolutionary 
Iran therefore would serve as a key component in the United State’s decision to 
support Iraq over its former ally. Despite Hussein’s character and past support for 
terrorist organizations, the United States recognized intelligence and material aid to 
Iraq would best serve its interests to blunt the spread of the Iranian revolution. 
Joana Dodds and Ben Wilson state, “Saddam feared that the Shi’a population 
might rise up against him. He attempted diplomatic approaches to the new Islamic 
Republic; however, Iran also offered enticing new possibilities. Iran, which once 
dominated the region, was in trouble. Its once-mighty army was in shambles and its 
all-important ties with Western powers severed.”198 Saudi Arabia in particular 
looked suspiciously on wider Iranian designs for the region and Khomeini’s open 
calls for revolution to the Shiite minorities of the Gulf kingdom.199 Stated simply, US 
policy makers and their Gulf allies sought a policy which sought to prevent 
Khomeini from securing a victory over Iraq, asserting a more dominant position 
over world oil markets as well as stopping Tehran’s ambition to support extremist 
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OFFSHORE BALANCING  
 
The theory of offshore balancing is described as a foreign policy strategy 
whereby an outside state relies upon regional proxies or allies to protect mutual 
interests and in which the outside power will only engage its forces to address an 
immediate threat to its primacy. In the case of offshore balancing, the outside 
power, such as the United States in the case of the Middle East, will seek to keep its 
forces “over the horizon” in an effort to only commit forces where/when it is 
absolutely necessary.200 Stephen Walt states the United States’ interest in the 
Persian Gulf have long been best maintained by adopting a policy of offshore 
balancing which recognizes, “we have to make sure that Persian Gulf oil doesn't fall 
under the control of a single hostile power.” However he also notes this policy is a 
realistic assessment of military force noting,  “Intervening with our own forces 
should only be a last resort, partly because other countries see U.S. power as 
potentially dangerous. Offshore balancing recognizes that U.S. power can do many 
good things, but the United States is not good at running other societies and we 
should stay out of that business. Finally, offshore balancing recognizes that there are 
limits to U.S. power.”201  
                                                        
200 Layne, Christopher. “America’s Middle East grand strategy after Iraq: the moment for 
offshore balancing has arrived.” Review of International Studies, no. 35 (2009): 5-25.; 
Layne, Christopher. "Offshore Balancing Revisited." Washington Quarterly 25, no. 2 (Spring 
2002): 233-248.; 
Walt, Stephen M. "In the National Interest: A New Grand Strategy for American Foreign Policy." 
Boston Review 30, no. 1 (February /March 2005). 
201 Ikenberry, G. John, and Stephen Walt. "Offshore Balancing or International Institutions? The 
Way Forward for U.S. Foreign Policy." Brown Journal Of World Affairs 14, no. 1 (Winter2007 
2007): 14.  
 108 
Christopher Layne notes states applying offshore balancing theory typically have 
two primary objectives minimizing the risk of a future great power and enhancing a 
state’s standing in the international system. Rather than conducting outright 
involvement into a regional conflict, the outside power is able to calculate its 
political and military aid to one or both of the power as a matter of checking each 
other’s adventures. In the case of the Iran Iraq War, the United States provided 
covert aid to both sides and at varying times likely as part of a strategy to prevent 
outright victory by either side.202 Similarly, John Mearsheimer recognizes the United 
State’s involvement in this conflict was in keeping with its previous policies in the 
Middle East, “Reagan’s decision was neither surprising nor controversial, because 
the United States had an offshore-balancing strategy in the Middle East during this 
period. Washington relied on Iraq to contain Iran during the 1980s, and kept the 
rapid-deployment force—which was built to intervene in the Gulf if the local 
balance of power collapsed—at the ready should it be needed. 203 
 “Offshore balancing, moreover, is nothing new: the United States pursued such 
a strategy in the Middle East very successfully during much of the cold war. It never 
tried to garrison the region or transform it along democratic lines. Instead, 
Washington sought to maintain a regional balance of power by backing various 
local allies and by developing the capacity—in the form of the Rapid Deployment 
Force (RDF), which brought together five Army and Marine divisions, seven tactical 
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fighter wings and three aircraft-carrier battle groups—to deter or intervene 
directly if the Soviet Union, Iraq or Iran threatened to upend the balance.” 
As it relates to America’s position in the Middle East, political scientist 
Christopher Layne believes the United States employed a consistent strategy since 
the Cold War as it has sought to prevent the emergence of a single hegemon in the 
region. In the Cold War this resulted in the United States forging alliances with Saudi 
Arabia and Iran to prevent Soviet dominance but also to ensure neither of these 
states could themselves assert a hegemonic position in the vital region.  
 As US policy makers sought to define the nature of their relationships with 
the Gulf States to include their longtime ally Shah Reza Pahlavi, then national 
security advisor Henry Kissinger coined the term, “twin pillars strategy.”204 Under 
this framework, the United States would seek to bolster the non-communist regimes 
of the Gulf, primarily Saudi Arabia and Iran. Henry Kissinger noted, “The vacuum left 
by the British withdrawal would be filled by a local power friendly to us.”205  
Regarding the previous British strategy Toby Craig Jones writes, “U.S. policy 
makers observed the doctrine in the Gulf by keeping American military forces “over 
the horizon.” Without the British present to preserve the Gulf’s balance of power, 
the United States moved to build up local militaries to maintain regional order.”206 
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Jones believes American aid to these states, and Iran in particular, was calculated to 
ensure a delicate balance existed in the region to protect the vital access to oil for 
Western economies as well as to stave-off any potential interference from the Soviet 
Union. While the 1973 oil embargo had radically altered the nature of the 
relationships between Western oil companies and Middle Eastern oil states, the 
countries of the Gulf region recognized they depended upon outside American 
power to guarantee their security as well.   
 While both theories provide key insights into American policy-maker’s 
decisions they fail to fully explain the United State’s deeper suspicions about Soviet 
influence in the region and the possibility for Russian military action into Iran. To be 
sure, the Iranian Revolution sent shockwaves across the traditional power centers 
of the Middle East and changed the existing status quo over night, however US 
officials maintained hope they would be able to work with the new regime’s more 
moderate members. While the Iran-Contra scandal fails to fully define the scope of 
US relations with Iran during this period it is important to note American planners 
did not view Iran as a pyrrhic state during the Iran-Iraq War. As the United States 
provided key intelligence to the Iraqi regime, it also sought to reestablish the 
previous balance of power. However, when viewed through the wider context of the 
Cold War additional analysis needs to be made to understand what role Soviet 






Analysis   
 
 INITIAL OVERTURES TO IRAN  
Subsequent to the British withdrawal of forces from east of the Suez in 1968, the 
United States soon became the leading outside power in the Middle East. While the 
British Empire had maintained a dominant position in the region for nearly a 
century by combining protection and outright coercion to the Gulf States the United 
States recognized the inherent strategic necessity of replacing Britain’s leadership in 
the region.207 While American officials outwardly recognized they had neither the 
resources nor desire to supplant the British Imperial role in the region, they 
recognized the growing power of both Saudi Arabia and Iran which could serve as 
valuable proxies to safeguard American interests.208 This policy, first adopted under 
the Nixon Administration recognized the strategic role both nations could play in 
stunting Soviet influence in the region as well as balancing against Arab states who 
received large amounts of aid from Moscow.209 
The Iraqi invasion of Iran in 1980 was designed to strike a quick blow on a 
nation reeling from deep-seated political divisions and internal instability. Saddam’s 
stated goal of occupying the oil rich and Arab-majority region of Khuzestan was also 
designed to exploit perceived Iranian weakness at an opportune moment. This 
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initial invasion took Washington and other Western powers by surprise. Writing in 
Foreign Affairs Claudi Wright noted. The U.S. and Western response apparently was 
to increase naval forces in the area on the basis of bilateral consultations. Happily 
these forces were kept "over the horizon. Any such action [such as direct US 
involvement] would surely both have divided the allies and been perceived by Iraq 
as a move in support of Iran, with its remaining port of Bandar Abbas on the 
Gulf.”210 
 During the initial years of the Iran – Iraq War, the United States maintained a 
policy of official neutrality towards the conflict. Many within Washington believed in 
the possibility the United States and Iran could mend relations are rebuild the 
previous level of bi-lateral military cooperation that existed during the time of the 
Shah. The Iranian military in particular though ravaged by waves of purges, still 
contained a large amount of American trained officers with whom Washington 
believed it could influence. This initial support would include the release of key 
Iranian financial assets abroad as well as a resumption of military material 
necessary for the fledgling Iranian armed forces. Writing in Foreign Affairs in 1980, 
Claudia Wright stated a common view among Washington’s foreign policy elite 
noting the United States had little leverage over Iraq and likely would benefit more 
by supporting Tehran to return the region to its status-quo balance.211  
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However, as the war continued and began to shift in favor of Iran, the United 
States and other Gulf States (Kuwait and Saudi Arabia) began to provide key 
intelligence to Iraq as well as financial backing and lines of credit. Ray Takeyh notes, 
“As the war dragged on and Iran grew determined to export its revolution, the 
sheikhdoms sided with the Iraqi strongman. Along this path, they augmented Iraq’s 
military capabilities, came together in an unprecedented anti-Iranian alliance in the 
form of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and sporadically tried their hands at 
diplomacy that they hoped would somehow end the conflict.”212 While Washington’s 
Gulf allies backed Hussein, American remained cautiously on the sidelines of the 
opening years of the conflict. Some within the Carter and then Reagan 
Administration’s believed bi-lateral relations with the Islamic Republic could be 
renewed again under the aegis of confronting a common foe in the Soviet Union.  
During the initial stages of the conflict the United States sought to maintain a 
delicate balance between Baghdad and Tehran still believing it could leverage both 
sides in an effort to return the Persian Gulf to its prior, albeit tenuous, stability.  
To increase its limited leverage with Tehran, the United States began a series of 
covert arm sales to the Islamic Republic through a complex series of transactions 
involving Israeli intelligence and trusted back channels. The Iran Contra affair, as it 
would become known, was devised by Reagan Administration officials as a key 
bargaining chip for American hostages held captive by the Iranian affiliated terrorist 
organization Hezbollah.  
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This covert operation was driven by two sets of motives. Reagan approved the 
project in hopes of inducing Iran to arrange the return of US hostages held by radical 
Shiite groups in Lebanon and also larger strategic concerns of possible Soviet 
influence through Tehran.  
In the aftermath of what became the largest scandal of the Reagan 
Presidency, the bipartisan Tower Commission noted, “the U.S. Government had a 
latent and unresolved interest in establishing ties to Iran. Few in the U.S. 
Government doubted Iran's strategic importance or the risk of Soviet meddling in 
the succession crisis that might follow the death of Khomeini. For this reason, some 
in the U.S. Government were convinced that efforts should be made to open 
potential channels to Iran.”213 Similar to its relationship with Baghdad, 
Washington’s efforts towards Iran were intended to check any possible Soviet 
involvement in the conflict. It was believed covert relations with the Islamic 
government would prevent Tehran from seeking aid from the Soviet Union as well 
as fostering relations with moderate leaders within the regime. 214  
 
FEAR OF SOVIET INVOLVEMENT/TILT TOWARDS BAGHDAD  
As the Iran Iraq War continued throughout the 1980s and showed little signs 
of ending in a decisive victory for either side, the United States recognized the 
tenuous hold Iraqi forces had on their strategic oil fields in the south of the country. 
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As the possibility of an Iranian victory seemed more and more likely the United 
States began sharing sensitive intelligence to Hussein and his commanders through 
the Central Intelligence Agency’s Baghdad station. Brands cautions however that 
while the US gave Iraq access to vital military intelligence, “It would be a mistake to 
overstate the Reagan administration’s enthusiasm for working with Saddam.  
The subtle shift in Washington’s policy towards the war closely after Iranian 
military victories and counteroffensive into Iraqi territory in 1982 can be linked to a 
desire to maintain balance rather than outright victory by either side. Michael 
Sterner points to these events as a seminal change in Washington’s tone and 
support towards Baghdad noting, the first shift in US official attitudes came in the 
wake of Iran's impressive military victories in 1982 when it appeared that the Iraqis 
might collapse leaving Iran in a commanding position of power throughout the 
Gulf.215 In addition to American fears of growing Iranian power, Gulf States too 
began openly supporting Iraq as fears of a spreading Islamic revolution spread 
amongst the Gulf-Arab states.216 
Senior US officials such as National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane were 
without illusions as to the nature of the Baathist regime and made little secret of the 
fact that they preferred Iraq only in comparison to Iran. US policy, wrote McFarlane, 
‘is not out of political affection for Saddam Hussein, but rather because of the 
instability and chaos his regime’s collapse could trigger throughout the Gulf. The 
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US–Iraq relationship, in McFarlane’s view, was one of necessity, not amity.”217 This 
support to Hussein was recognized the delicate balance of power, which had long 
served US interests prior to and after the Islamic Revolution. An overwhelming 
victory by either side would likely affect American access to oil or provide Iran or 
Iraq an unacceptable monopoly over regional oil resources.   
The fear of Soviet action and the ensuing instability in Iran likely served as a 
prime driver for increased American involvement in the region. Washington 
recognized any change in the status quo could present Moscow with the necessary 
strategic incentive to increase its influence either through covert or overt 
involvement. The possibility the Soviet Union could take a more activist through 
support to Baghdad drove the United States to begin a diplomatic rapprochement 
with Iraq in the early years of the Iran – Iraq War. Then National Security Advisor 
Zbigniew Brzezinski believed the Soviet presence in Afghanistan could serve as a 
jumping-off point for a larger-scale invasion of Pakistan or Iran.218  
In 1983 Washington increased its arms supplies to Baghdad as a more formal 
diplomatic relationship was sought. Donald Rumsfeld was dispatched to Baghdad to 
meet with Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz as well as President Saddam Hussein. 
The Reagan Administration believed in keeping with the previous Carter Doctrine 
and to prevent a challenge to the regional status quo, the United State’s needed to 
take a more activist role in the ongoing Iran-Iraq War.  
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Stephen Walt observes, “When the shah fell, the United States created the 
Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (rdjtf) but did not deploy it to the region; 
instead, it kept the rdjtf over the horizon until it was needed. Washington backed 
Iraq against Iran during the 1980s, and the U.S. Navy escorted oil tankers during the 
Iran- Iraq War, but it deployed U.S. ground and air forces only when the balance of 
power broke down completely, as it did when Iraq seized Kuwait. This strategy was 
not perfect, perhaps, but it preserved key U.S. interests at minimal cost for over four 
decades.”219   
The US involvement in the Iran-Iraq War was likely not connected to 
Washington’s desire to stop the spread of Islamist ideology but rather to maintain 
the balance of power in the region; this balance was necessary to prevent either Iraq 
or Iran from emerging as potential hegemons and threatening Saudi oil production. 
Despite the revolutionary nature of the Iranian regime, American action was 
influenced by a realistic assessment of national interests and recognition of Tehran 
and Baghdad as competing power centers in the region. This policy represented a 
case of offshore balancing whereby it sought to maintain a tentative status quo in 
the region to prevent either Iran or Iraq from emerging in a stronger position 
relative to its adversary. Additionally this policy of seeking to maintain  balance was 
one previous Administrations had maintained during the time of the Shah and even 
after the Islamic Revolution.  
Revolutionary Iran posed a number of threats for the more traditional power 
centers of Riyadh and Baghdad with most Arab leaders viewing the theocratic 
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government as a threat to the regional status quo. To be sure the, the United States 
had little common cause with either the Islamic Republic or the Iraqi regime but had 
a number of vital interests in the region, which it sought to protect. Amidst the still 
ongoing Cold War between East and West, the United States viewed the Middle East 
as a vital theater and quite possibly an Achilles heel were it to fall under Soviet 
influence or the delicate balance of power were to shift.  
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian Revolution in the same year 
confirmed numerous fears amongst Washington’s foreign policy elite that the 
Middle East could now become a target for further Russian attempts to gain 
influence as well as access to the Gulf’s warm water ports.220 Possibly sensing an 
opportunity to strike at the revolutionary government and recognizing a key pillar 
of American defense policy had been removed, Saddam Hussein conducted a large –
scale invasion of Iran. The Soviet Union’s military action in Afghanistan was likely 
viewed as a possible change in Soviet policy towards the Middle East. This coupled 
with Iran’s revolution sent shockwaves throughout American defense and security 
circles as Moscow’s aggressive actions could presumptively signal a desire to project 
power into the unstable Middle East region and challenge America’s traditional role 
of outside balancer.  
As outlined above, the Carter Doctrine was designed to directly challenge not the 
Iranian Revolution but rather Soviet involvement in the region. Carter’s 1980 State 
of the Union address was intended to broadcast American resolve with respect to 
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the Middle East stating, "An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the 
Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United 
States. It will be repelled by the use of any means necessary, including military 
force.”221  Along with the address, American military involvement in the region 
began a significant re-orientation as military planners began preparations for a 
Soviet invasion of the Persian Gulf to include the possibility of a seizure of Saudi oil 
fields. David Crist notes a classified CIA report believed the fall of the Shah and the 
success of the Islamic Revolution would likely result in a strategic windfall for the 
Soviet Union.222 This fear most likely influenced Washington to begin a slow but 
steady tilt towards Baghdad as its favored proxy in the conflict.  
In its June 18th 1984 editorial, The New Republic identified US policy in the 
Middle East succinctly when it noted, “The United States cannot tolerate the fall of 
the oil states to the permanent control of a hostile power. The imperative is 
geopolitical, because loss of the oil states would radically shift the balance of power 
in the Middle East, and the world, against the West and its allies. In the Middle East, 
the dominoes are made of paper.”223  Lingering American fears of Soviet 
involvement in Iran through internal subversion via the Communist Tudeh party as 
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well as a robust arms trade with Baghdad likely reinforced the existing suspicions of 
Soviet strategic intent for the region.224 
 As the conflict continued throughout the 1980s, American policy took a more 
activist tone as Washington began first providing tactical intelligence to Iraq 
followed by a more robust relationship involving a formal intelligence relationship 
through a CIA Chief of Station. Moreover, this relationship with Baghdad was further 
reinforced through a number of American-encouraged credit guarantees through 
numerous Gulf States.225 Raymong Heinbush notes, “the West was content to merely 
contain the war, in which these two potendal Gulf hegemons enervated each other 
to the benefit of the fragile pro- Western monarchies. However, once the US 
perceived an Iranian threat to close the Straits of Hormuz—hence stopping oil 
exports—it stepped up naval pressure on Iran.”226 As Washington sought to further 
strengthen its proxy relationship with Iraq, it sought to isolate Iran to return the 
region to the previous status quo. This outcome, and the use of one power in a 
regional conflict to effect the outcome for a third power is a clear indication of 
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 The Iran Iraq War cost approximately 1.25 million military and civilian over 
the course of the eight-year conflict amplifying already deep rifts between Arab 
states and Iran while resulting in a return to the status quo, which existed prior to 
the war. American involvement in this conflict took a number of forms but 
Washington began a marked tilt towards Baghdad following successful Iranian 
counterattacks. This tilt and the ensuing American support to Baghdad was 
designed with stability in mind; not as it related to simply Baghdad and Tehran but 
rather with a keen eye towards Soviet intentions. Like many other conflicts during 
the Cold War, the United States viewed the Iran – Iraq War as a future battleground 
between itself and the Soviet Union. The invasion of Afghanistan by Soviet troops in 
1980 likely reinforced these fears. The ensuing Carter Doctrine sought to place the 
United States into a more activist role in the region fearing a possible threat to its 
strategic oil assets.  
The United State’s shifting support to both Baghdad and Tehran was likely 
driven by larger strategic considerations, most notably, the American fear of Soviet 
involvement in the region and the possibility of a Russian intervention. While 
Washington was concerned with the threat a Tehran-backed revolution could pose 
towards other states in the region, US planners consistently highlighted the threat 
the Soviet Union continued to play in the vital region.  A weak Iranian government 
susceptible to Soviet influence, overt and covert, and an Arab Socialist regime, which 
maintained a large amount of Soviet material and technical assistance presented the 
United States a challenge to the existing status quo in the region. Therefore, the 
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United States likely recognized a status quo between Iran and Iraq as most 
beneficial to its interests.  
While the policy of Offshore Balancing provides some insight into American 
behavior, an assessment of the United State’s larger geostrategic environment – 
largely its competition with the Soviet Union – provides the most accurate context 
by which to view its behavior.  Washington’s support to both parties, in various 
forms and in differing degrees, was most likely driven by a desire to ensure neither 
side could upset the balance of power and possibly invite involvement from the 
Soviet Union. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 signaled to a number of 
prominent officials a possible larger Russian drive to acquire a warm-water port as 
well as access to Middle Eastern oil as well as threaten a crucial Western resource.  
The ultimate US foreign policy objective in the Middle East at this time was likely 
seeking a return to the previous balance of power between Tehran and Baghdad not 
only for the sake of balance but also more importantly as a means of stunting 
possible Soviet involvement. Despite a lack of evidence to support the Soviet Union 
intended an outright invasion of Iran, US defense and intelligence planners 
maintained a suspicious view of Soviet intentions in Afghanistan, similarly viewing 
that action as a necessary step towards further involvement in the Persian Gulf.  
 
While US decision makers viewed the Islamic regime and its calls for global 
Islamic revolution, the key driver to understanding American actions should be a 
larger focus on US – Soviet competition. Andrew Mumford states, “Where state or 
group survival is not at stake but the augmentation of national interests or 
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ideological gains can still be achieved, states and sub-state groups have historically 
proven to be conspicuous users of proxy methods as a means of securing particular 
conflict outcomes.”227  
Even following the US Embassy hostage crisis of the late 1970s and hostile anti-
American rhetoric, officials in Washington believed Iran could be persuaded to 
rejoin the previous US-led security strategy for the region with the ultimate aim of 
containing possible Soviet advances. This long-standing fear of increased Soviet 
involvement in the region likely served as the prime driver for American 
involvement in the conflict. 228 As the Islamic Republic recovered from its initial 
battlefield loses and conducted a large scale counterattack, Washington re-
evaluated its involvement in the regional conflict. The opportunity to thwart Iranian 
hegemony in the region as well as replace the Soviet Union as Iraq’s benefactor in 
the region proved irresistible to the Reagan Administration. Despite deep suspicion 
within Washington foreign policy circles regarding Saddam’s true capacity, support 
to Iraq and the development of a proxy relationship served as a necessary means to 
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Proxy warfare has long been viewed by a range of states, hegemonic powers 
and regional powers alike, as an important tool of international policy. A large 
involvement of military forces oftentimes increases the risk destabilization and can 
lead to numerous unforeseen consequences. The use of non-state actors or a third 
party can oftentimes serve to advance a states national security interests while 
avoiding the unknown costs of overt military force. In the instances of Pakistan’s 
support to the Taliban, Iran’s support of Lebanese Hezbollah and the United States’ 
support to Iraq the sponsoring party was able to ensure security interests, whether 
it be affecting a government’s influence or a desire to maintain the status quo were 
attained through indirect involvement. Proxy wars can also serve as the stage for 
larger regional conflicts, such as in the case of the Iran-Iraq War. While states may 
calculate the costs of direct military engagement against peer competitors is too 
high, a proxy war often serves a battleground in the context of a larger strategic 
struggle.  
In “Proxy Warfare and the Future of Conflict” Andrew Mumford writes, “ 
President Dwight D Eisenhower once called proxy wars ‘the cheapest insurance in 
the world’, while former Pakistani President Zia-ul- Haq deemed them necessary to 
‘keep the pot boiling’ in existing conflict zones. The appeal of what can be 
characterized as ‘warfare on the cheap’ has proved an irresistible strategic allure for 
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nations through the centuries.”229 In each of the above case studies, state’s 
recognized the value of conducting a form of indirect warfare; shifting the burden of 
fighting to a third party, be they another state or a non-state actor, as a means of 
achieving strategic balancing against an outside party and ensuring national 
interests were secured.  
 Pakistan’s use of the Taliban in the 1990s can be seen as a successful use of 
warfare by proxy; the post-civil war Afghan government was largely amenable to 
Islamabad’s larger regional designs and more importantly would not become 
aligned with Pakistan’s archrival India. While the costs of supporting these militant 
groups appear to now be complicating Pakistan’s internal security, through the 
1990s they were a valuable low-cost option for the Pakistani military230. Faced with 
a similar set of strategic considerations as Imperial Britain – a largely ungoverned 
Afghanistan as a potential venue for regional competition – Pakistan’s intelligence 
services fostered clandestine relationships with both the Taliban and Hezb-i-
Gulbudin to ensure its vital interests would be protected. Islamabad’s covert 
relationship with these militant groups allowed it to achieve its desire for strategic 
balance to counter its larger neighbor and competitor India.  
 Similarly, Iran’s support to Lebanese Hezbollah allowed it to project its 
power through proxy. Faced with near international isolation amidst the Iran-Iraq 
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War, the Islamic Republic recognized the nascent organization as a valuable tool to 
both bolster its revolutionary credentials while also maximizing its power in the 
international system. A neo-realist examination of Iran’s support to this proxy 
provides a useful construct by which to analyze the key drivers for Iranian actions. 
Along with a status-quo in its war with Iraq and the ever-present role of the United 
States as an offshore balancer in the Middle East, Iran likely recognized it could best 
enhance its position in the international system through support to surrogates 
thereby attaining and important balance against hostile Arab states. As with 
Pakistan, this support provided the new revolutionary government a low-cost 
option to exert influence in the region, burnish its credentials throughout the region 
while also avoiding provoking a larger conflict with an outside power.  
 During the course of the Iran-Iraq War the United States leveraged its 
support to Baghdad so as to maintain strategic balance in the region while also 
dissuading outside interference by the Soviet Union. Fear of communist influence in 
the region and the possibility of further destabilization following the Iranian 
Revolution and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan heavily influenced Washington’s 
careful calculation to provide support to its proxy Iraq. Though highly unlikely in 
retrospect, the possibility Moscow would seek to use this conflict as a pretext for 
further military action served a as prime driver for American intervention in the 
conflict. Washington’s strategic reassessment in the aftermath of the 1973 oil 
embargo marked a significant pivot by the United States towards a more activist 
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approach in the vital region.231 Support to Baghdad vice an over military 
intervention provided Washington a means to ensure the region maintained a 
delicate balance, prevented any one power (Iran or Iraq) from gaining control over a 
majority of  oil resources as well as to prevent a Soviet alliance with any of the 
warring parties.  
Here as well, proxy warfare was successfully employed by an outside power 
to protect its national security interests. While the United States planned several 
contingencies in the event of Soviet intervention or an Iranian breakthrough the 
logistic hurdles, financial costs and potential political backlash dissuaded 
Washington committing conventional forces in large numbers. The United States 
would intervene several occasions during the Tanker War but only to maintain the 
free flow of oil and prevent further escalation of the conflict. Likewise, Iran’s proxy 
force in Lebanese Hezbollah provided Iran an alternative means to enhance its 
regional power and expend its influence to the Shiite minority amidst the Lebanese 
Civil War without risking outright confrontation. These considerations also affected 
Pakistan’s decision to covertly support the Taliban and HIG. Ever fearful of Indian 
military action, Pakistan’s generals determined support to its selected militant 
groups as a proxy force would allow Islamabad to achieve its desired end-state in 
Afghanistan.  
While the international system likely constrained the behavior of Pakistan, 
Iran and the United States – as offensive military action could have resulted in 
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unforeseen escalation – support to a selected surrogate allowed these states to 
maximize their power to enhance their survival. In the Iran-Iraq War the United 
States as a hegemonic power likely sought to maintain the existing status-quo; any 
change in relative balance between Iran and Iraq posed the possibility of upending 
the tenuous regional balance. Aware the costs, difficulty and the potential Indian 
response to an invasion of Afghanistan, Islamabad recognized its security could be 
maximized through a strong relationship with various Afghan militant 
organizations. Finally, Iran’s regional isolation prevented it from action its near-
abroad, however the possibility to foster a Shiite proxy would allow Tehran to 
challenge the existing strategic balance between it and the traditional Arab centers 
of power.  
 In all these cases, the neo-realist theoretical emphasis on strategic balance 
provides a useful guide to explain why states engage in this particular form of 
warfare. As previously discussed in this paper, the role of ideology in the Middle 
East and South Asia does not serve as a prime driver for state’s support to proxy 
groups. Rather the structure of the international system and a state’s desire to 
balance against perceived threats are likely the strongest influence on it’s behavior. 
Stephen Walt notes that “though there are reasons why we would think that alliance 
behavior in this region would be different from that in other areas, in fact Middle 
Eastern states adhere to neorealist hypotheses—they balance instead of 
bandwagon.232   
                                                        
232 Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987) 26.  
 
 129 
As is likely playing out in the current Syrian Civil War, war by proxy will 
continue to be used by states well into this century. While these wars can positively 
advance a state’s national security interests there are a number of spillover effects, 
which are often unforeseeable at the outset of intervention. In the case of American 
support to the Afghan mujahedeen in the 1980s the United States cost the Soviet 
Union its biggest strategic defeat of the Cold War. The forces unleashed by the 
destructive conflict however likely served to exacerbate the instability of 
Afghanistan. Little more than 10 years after the Cold War ended the United States 
would respond to the September 11th attacks with a large-scale military response to 
the Taliban Government. Many of these fighters benefited from earlier American 
largesse where allies soon became enemies. As was also the case in Iraq the United 
States would find itself drawn into a response following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.  
Despite these risks, proxy warfare will likely continue to be a constant fixture in 
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